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FOREWORD 
The Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson are known to have 
shortened the First World War by giving the German nation a pro-
gram upon which it cnuld agree to conclude peace. In effect, Wilson 1 s 
program saved them from. an unconditional surrender. Since that 
war, the Germans as a whole have claimed that they were betrayed 
by the Fourteen Points as they were not carried out as they should 
.. have been. It is the purpose of this work to investigate the German 
public opinion on the Fourteen Points from their inception to the 
fateful days of October , 1918, when the German nation agreed to 
conclude a peace on the basis of Wilson 1 s program. The author 
hopes that he has, in so doing, shed some light on the actual thinking 
of the German people at the time. Perhaps, then, the reader will be 
better able to decide for himself how much truth, if any, there is to 
the claim of betrayal. 
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BE LLIGERENT WAR AIMS AND 
THE FOUR TEEN P OINTS 
Most of the major nati ons whi ch entered the First World War 
did so by stumbling into it. Their governments, for the most part, 
declared war because they were defending some principl e which they 
held of vital importance to them or to fulfi ll the terms of some defen-
sive treaty. The declared war aims of Germany, Austria, France, 
Russia, and Great Britain were defensive in nature. Even the attack 
on Bel gium, the Germans maintai ned, was carried out to break her 
encir clement by hostile powers . 
But once these nations were committed and enormous 
sacrifices were mad e, there were those who began to think of ways 
to capitaliz e on the war . In each of the warring countries pressure 
groups deve l oped which, for various reasons, wanted the aggrandize-
ment of their parti cul a r nation. In Germany these groups were, 
roughly, the advocates of the Drang Nach Osten and a Mittel Europa, 
the naval and c olonial expansioni sts who dreamed of German naval 
d ominance and of a Mittel Afrika, and the western annexationists who 
expected to acquire Belgium and large portions of Northern France 
!or the Reich. The demands of these groups changed and varied 
during the war and there was a great deal of overlappi ng between them. 
For exampl e, ear ly in the war, September 2, 1914, Mattias Erzberger, 
2 
the Center Party leader, drafted a memorandum to the government 
which set forth the minimum aims for a German peace. These terms 
included all the individual war aims of the expansionist groups. 1 
Later on in the war he, influenced by the unfavorable course of the 
conflict, gradually moderated his aims and was eventually the driving 
force behind the Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 19, 1917. 
The annexationist groups were mainly of the Right and Center. 
However, even Social Democratic views were modified at times by 
annexation aims. On March 22, 1915, the Socialist Frankfurter 
Volkstimme said that 
The renunciation of all demands of annexation 
is in itself not a serviceable program. Social Democracy 
must put forward positive demands, and these demands 
can and must include modifications in maps. All must 
t . ·t 2 no remain as 1 was. 
However, the majority of the Social Democrats remained 
true to their ideals of universal peace and international conciliation. 
As early as August 4, 1914, they had declared: 
We demand that, as soon as the aim of protec-
tion shall have been attained and the enemies be inclined 
1Germany, Reichstag, Verhandlungen des Reichstag, XIII. 
Legislaturperiode, II. Sitzung, Stenographischer Bericht, Vol. 307, 
p. 856. 
2H. Stroebel, Deutsche Revolution {Berlin: Verlag Neues 
Vaterland, 1922), p. 16. 
toward peace, the war be ended by a peace which 
shall render possible friendship with our neigh-
bors. 3 
3 
This was the 11 peace of understanding 11 or the 11Scheidemann Peace 11 as 
it was often called, for the Social Democratic leader. 
The annexationist and anti - annexationist forces engaged in a 
bitter struggle to determine German war aims. The conflict grew as 
the war progressed and in effect prevented Germany from ever 
categorically stating her war aims. Consequently, the Imperial 
German Government left the question of war aims vague and undecided 
and kept reiterating the defensive nature of the war. 
In Austria-Hungary there was little expansionist sentiment. 
If anything, the Empire was overexpanded. The heterogeneous nature 
of the Dual Monarchy made a concerted and effective war effort 
impossible, and, after having been largely responsible for precipitat-
ing the war, the chief war aim of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
was to preserve the Empire as a political entity. 
Among the Entente powers the situation was somewhat 
different. In the Allied countries the war was played up as a great 
crusade, a fight for justice, Austria-Hungary 1s attack nn Serbia and 
Germany• s invasion of Belgium gave the Entente nations a corner on 
international morality. The Entente was a coalition which had 
3R. H. Lutz (Ed.), Fall of the German Empire (Stanford, 
1932), I., 8. 
4 
banded together largely for self-protection. However, with the excep-
tions of England and the United States, all had definite territorial 
aspirations. This caused a much l ess open, if not less honest, handl-
ing of the question of war aims in the Entente nations than in Germany 
and Austria-Hungary. If they were defending right and justice, they 
could not be fighting for annexations. The governments of the Entente 
were therefore forced to enter into agreements with one another in 
which the national aspirations of each of the Entente members were 
recognized. Consequently, each Entente nation had two groups of 
official war aims; the major ones which were of particular interest 
to itself, and the minor aims which constituted those of its allies. 
The Major aims of one nation became the minor aims of its allies, 
and naturally enough with such a complicated arrangement, contra-
dictions occurred. These agreements were the so-called "secret 
treaties" of 1915, 1916, and 1917. 
By the terms of these treaties and understandings (some of 
them were not official treaties}, Italy, in return for entering the 
war in 1915, was offered large portions of Austriai territory, control 
of the northern Adriatic and a considerable slice of the Turkish 
Empire. Rumania, too, was offered extensive territories at the 
expense of Austria-Hungary for her entry into the war in 1916. 
Russia was assured control of the Dardanelles and an extension of 
territory into northern Asia Minor; the French claim to Syria was 
recognized by England and Russia; and Japan was given a free hand 
in the ultimate fate of the Shangtung Peninsul a and a promise of 
German c olonies in the Pacific north of the equator. 4 Of as great 
importance as these rnore formal treaties and agreements was the 
understanding that 11 the crime of 187 111 should be erased. Then, 
5 
too, there was the informal agreement between Russia and France 
that each should have a free hand in disposing of German territories 
bordering on their respective frontiers. 
These "secret treaties" were in effect the real war aims 
of the Entente powers. They were much 1nore definite than the vague 
platitudes which filled the speeches of Allied statesmen. Although 
their public disclosure in November, 1917, caused great shock in 
liberal and left-wing circles in the world and their importance at 
the Versailles settl ement caused many Americans to view them as 
evil, these treaties were quite natural and had a great deal of justi-
fication. Sir Edward Grey, a high-minded statesman, even had a 
hand in negotiating some of them, and, although it was displeasing 
for him to do so, he asserted that it had been an absolute necessity 
to do so. After all, it was a war, ~ outrance, and one had to get 
one's allies where one could find them, just as Germany had done 1n 
in the cases of Bul garia and Turkey. 
5 
These treaties were, however, 
manifestly in contradiction to the righteous crusading pose of the Allies. 
4Manchester Guardian, December 13, 1917. 
5E. Grey, Twenty Five Years (New York: Stokes, 1925), II, 
166. 
6 
When the United States entered the war, a new factor came 
into play. Wilson had been active in trying to bring about a peace. 
The German unrestricted submarine warfare had forced Wilson to 
ask Congress to declare war. Again, a nation went to war to defend 
a principle, that of freedom of the seas. 
Before April 2, 1917, Wilson had made attempts at a 11 peace 
without victory". After April 2, 1917, the American nation was 
committed to a military victory over Germany. But in Wilson I s 
mind there was always the idea that the war must result in a better, 
more rational world. In his April 2 speech to Congress to ask for 
a declaration of war, he said: 
Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the 
principles of peace and justice in the life of the world 
as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up 
amongst the really free and self-governing nations of 
the world such a concert of purpose and action as will 
henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. 6 
It is known that Wilson became aware of the 11 secret treaties 11 
soon after America 1 s entry into the war, He, Colonel Edward House, 
his closest personal advisor, and Lord Balfour, who was the B ritish 
Foreign Minister at the time, discussed the territorial issues at 
length on April 28, 1917. 7 Wilson could not, however, at that stage 
6R. S. BakerandW. E. Dodd(Eds.), Presidential 
Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers ( 1917 -1924) (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1917), I, 11. -- --
7 C. Seymour (Ed.), The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), III, -43-49. 
7 
of the war make any protests against the 11 secret treatie s 11 • It was a 
time when complete unity of purpose was necessary to coordinate the 
war effort. On July 21, 191 7, he wrote a letter to House in which he 
said: 
Engl and and Franc.e have not the same views 
with regard to peace that we have by any means. When 
the war is over, we can force them to our way of think-
ing, because by that time they will, among other things, 
be financially in our hands; but we cannot force them 
now, and any attempt to speak for them or to our com-
mon mind would bring on disagreements which would 
inevitably come to the surface in public and rob the 
whole thing of its effect. 8 
Another factor played a part in preventing Wilson fro1n 
clashing with the Allies over war aims. Wilson, who was a great 
orator, provided in his speeches the best material for the Allied 
propaganda to the Central Powers. So effective were his speeches 
as a weapon that it was as important to coordinate war aims as it was 
to coordinate material effort. As far as possible, differences 
between the United States and her allies were to be avoided. 
Wilson I s speeches had, in effect, two aspects; the construe -
tive one of providing a charter for a new and better world, and the 
destructive one of stimulating German discontent with the German 
Government. In his April 2 speech he said, 11 We have no quarrel 
with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of 
8 c. Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World vVar 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), p. 270. -
sympathy and fr i endship. 11 
C olone l House encouraged Wilson to deve l op this appeal. 
On May 30, 1917, he wrote to Wilson, "Imperial Germany shoul d be 
broken down from within as well as from w ithout. 11 9 
In his d i ary of May 19, 1917, he wrote: 
Give the German liberals every possible encour-
agement so that they can tell the German people, "Here 
is your immediate chanc e for peace because the offer 
comes from your enemies, who will treat with you any 
time you are in condi tion to express your thoughts 
through a representative government. On the other hand, 
the present government is offering you peace through 
conquest, whi ch, of necessity, has all the elements of 
chance and cannot be relied upon." lO 
8 
In continuance of such a p olicy the President in his F l ag Day 
speech of June 14, 19 17, appealed to the German people. 
We are not the enemi es of the German people ...• 
They did not originate or desire this hideous war ... we are 
vaguel y conscious that we are fighting their cause, as 
they will some day see it, as well as our own. They are 
themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has 
now at last stretched its ugly tal ons out and drawn b l ood 
from us. 11 
This speech had very little effect in Germany. But the 
President was soon given another opportunity to reiterate his funda-
mental thesis that there was an essential difference between the 
German people and their warmongering government. 
9seymour, Intimate Papers, Vol. III, p. 133. 
l Oibid. , Vol. III, p. 132. -- . 
11 Baker and Dodd, Presidential Messages, I, 61-62. 
In Germany, Erzberger, who was in touch with Ottokar 
Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, had prepared the way for 
9 
the mediation of Pope Benedict XV by getting, in conjunction with the 
party leaders of the Left and Center, the Peace Resolution of July 19, 
1917, through the Reichstag. 
This resolution called for "a peace of understanding and 
permanent reconciliation of peoples 11 • It came out against "forced 
territorial acquisitions" and against political, economic, and finan-
cial oppression. It also declared in favor of freedom of the seas 
and the II creation of international judicial organizations 11 • 12 This 
resolution was passed by 212 votes against the 126 votes of the 
Right and the Independent Socialists (who wanted a more far-reaching 
statement). 
In August, the Pope made his appeal for peace based on the 
principles of complete restoration of occupied territory, disarma-
ment, and international arbitration. 13 On the twenty-fifth of the same 
month, Wilson publicly answered the Pope in a speech in which he 
highlighted three main ideas; that the word of the present German 
leaders was worthless, an appeal to the German people to throw off 
these leaders and express themselves, and an offer to Germany of 
12Lutz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 282-283. 
13K. Forster, The Failures of Peace (Washington, D. C.: 
1941), pp. 128-129. 
10 
assurances as to its econo1nic integrity. 14 
But Wilson realized that it was necessary to formulate war 
aims more distinctly and concretely than had been done. It was not 
only important to defeat Germany, but also to prepare a definite 
program for peace. It was from this realization that the so-called 
Inquiry was born. 
In August, 1917, five months after America's entry into the 
war, Colonel House, at Wilson's request, gathered together a body 
of experts who were to collect data which might be needed eventually 
at a peace conference. This group of men was drawn chiefly from 
the faculties of universities and was under the direction of Dr. Sidney 
E. Menzes, President of the City College of New York and Colonel 
House's brother-in-law. On this Inquiry were men such as Mr. 
Walter Lippmann, Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Professor Charles H. Haskins, 
Professor R. H. Lord, Professor Charles Seymour, and Professor 
James F. Shotwell. This group of experts became a sort of second 
State Department. 
The general world political situation in late 1917 did not 
allow a continued emphasis on the beat Germany theme, for a new 
dimension had been added to the world scene. In March, 1917, the 
Tsarist regime fell and a new government of Liberal-Socialist flavor 
took over in Russia. Internal corruption, the dry-rot of three 
14Baker and Dodd, op. cit., p. 93-96. 
11 
hundred years of the Romanov dynasty, and extreme war-weariness 
and revulsion to war on the part of the Russian people had brought 
the end of Imperial Russia. 
The Allied powers completely misinterpreted the significance 
of what was happening in Russia. They welcomed the substitution of 
a democratic government for the autocracy of the Tsar as this 
removed the apparent contradiction which was posed by the alliance of 
democratic powers with such an autocracy. It also removed a great 
stumbling block to the participation of an idealistic President and a 
democ ratic America in the war. The provisional governments of 
Prince Lvov and later of Alexander Kerensky were committed to the 
continuance of the war on the side of the Entente. It was precisely 
this insistance on war to the end which caused their downfall in turn. 
The situation in Russia at this time was unstable, fluid, 
and explosive. Besides the Provisional Government, another body 
had sprung up which soon exercised considerable governmental power. 
It was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers 1 , Soldiers 1 , and Peasants 1 
Deputies. Although not officially a government, it was recognized 
by the soldiers and industrial workers of Petrograd as their governing 
authority. It was these workers and soldiers who had toppled the 
Tsar's regime. This Soviet on March 27, 1917, issued a proclama-
tion to the peoples of the world appealing to the working class that 
they take steps to end the war. 15 On May 15 the Petrograd Soviet 
issued another manifesto to the Socialists of all countries which 
reiterated the March 2 7 proclamation and urged that the Socialists 
of the world take steps to force their respective governments to 
adopt a "platform of peace without annexations or indemnities, on 
the basis of the self-determination of peoples". 16 
12 
At this time an international socialist conference was held 
at Stockholm to examine the possibilities for peace. The conference 
was a failure for, although Russian, German, Austrian, Dutch, 
Scandinavian, and Bulgarian delegates met there in July, the English, 
French, Belgian, and American delegates were forbidden to attend 
by their respective governments. However, labor c i rcles in both 
England and France were greatly disturbed by the meeting and their 
governments I refusal to allow attendance. 
In October the Entente powers announced that an Inter-Allied 
conference would commence in Paris on November 10. But by Novem-
ber, the Petrograd Soviet was under the control of the Bolsheviks and 
the desire for peace on the part of the Russian people was so g reat 
that a coup d'etat led by Vladimir Lenin was possible and the P rovi:-
sional Government of Kerensky was toppled. On the evening of 
15 A. F. Kerensky, The Catastrophe (New York: D. Appleton 
& Company, 1927), p. 170. 
16seymour, American Diplom acy, p. 279. 
13 
November 8, a decree of peace was passed by the new government. 
This decree again called for 11 an immediate peace without annexations 
and without indemnities" and stated that the 
... Government abolishes secret diplomacy and in 
its part expresses the intention to conduct all 
negotiations absolutely openly before the entire 
people; it will at once publish in full the secret 
treaties concluded or confirmed by the Govern-
ment of landowners and capitalists ... 
and "the Government proposes to all the governments and peoples of 
all belligerent countries to conclude an armistice immediately 11 • 1 7 
Although the position of the new regime was, to say the least, 
precarious, the Bolsheviks on November 20 addressed a formal re-
quest to the Allied ambassadors to consider immediate peace 
negotiations. 18 At this time the Inter-Allied Conference was being 
held at Paris. The original purpose of the conference had been to 
discuss coordination of military and economic efforts. Now it had to 
consider these most pressing of diplomatic problems; namely, how 
could the defection of Russia from the war be prevented; and, if not, 
how could the adverse effect of the publication of the secret treaties 
and the appeal for peace to labor in Britain and France by the Bolshe -
viks be combatted? 
It. seemed absolute l y necessary now to Wilson and House to 
l 7w. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1935), pp. 472-474. 
18seymour, American Diplomacy, p. 278. 
14 
achieve coordinated war aims with the Allies. Lord Lansdowne in 
England pleaded for such an Allied statement, and in France Aristide 
Briand, the ex-Premier, advocated the statement of some concrete 
war aims. l9 But the Allied war leaders could not agree on any com-
bined statement for reasons peculiar to each. On November 31 Colonel 
House, who represented Wilson in Paris, submitted a manifesto to 
the conference. 
The Allies and the United States declare that 
they are not waging war for the purpose of aggression 
or indemnity. The sacrifices they are making in 
order that militarism shall not continue to cast its 
shadow over the world, and that nations shall have the 
right to lead their lives in the way that seems to them 
best for the development of their general welfare. 20 
But the leaders of England, France, and Italy in various 
degrees opposed the issuance of this manifesto. The decision was 
reached not to issue a joint declaration but to leave this to the 
individual powers. 
It was from this failure at Paris to state war aims that the 
Fourteen Points resulted. On December l, House cabled Wilson 
urging him to postpone any statement on foreign affairs until he, 
House, returned to the United States. 21 He had in mind that Wilson 
should make the needed statement of war aims. President Wilson, 
191bid., p. 280. 
20seymour, Intimate Papers, p. 282. 




on getting House's report, agreed that something had to be done. The 
Bolsheviks had already released the texts of the secret treaties, and 
on December 13, the Manchester Guardian published the essential 
texts of these treaties. Allied war sacrifices could not now so readily 
be justified on the grounds of international morality and something had 
to be done to reinvigorate the enthusiasm of labor circles. Also, as 
the Bolsheviks had concluded an armistice with the Germans on 
December 15, there was urgent need to influence the Russian situation 
favorably for the Allies. 
Peace negotiations between the Russians and the Central 
Powers opened on December 24 at Brest-Litovsk. The chief negotia-
tors for Russia were Adolph Joffe, a revolutionary intellectual, and 
Lev Kamenev, Leon Trotsky's brother-in-law. For the Central 
Powers, Baron Richard Kuehlmann, as Foreign Minister, represented 
Germany and Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, represented the Dual Monarchy. As official advisor and 
actual chef ~e delegation, Major General Max Hoffman, who represented 
the German High Command, completed the list of the principal 
negotiators for the Central Powers. 
On the opening day the Russians presented their proposals 
for the basis of the peace, one which they hoped would include all the 
warring nations. These proposals adhered closely to the ideals of 
the Bolshevik peace proposals of November 8; namely, no forceful 
expropriation of territories, no indemnities, and self-determination 
16 
of all peoples. 
On Christmas Day, the Central Powers answered through 
the voice of Czernin, agreeing in principle to the Russian formula. 
In Germany the answer of December 25 caused a great deal of press 
and public reaction. The Center and Left parties of the Reichstag 
Majority greeted the situation favorably because it appeared to them 
an adherence to the Resolution of July 19. The parties of the Right 
considered December 25 as a day of infamy. It was to them a sell-
out of Germany's rights -- a betrayal of the men in the field. 
The Russians, for their part, misunderstood the gist of the 
Central Powers' acceptance and considered that, in effect, Russia 
would keep Russian Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. This was 
never the German intention, for her negotiators felt that for military 
and diplomatic reasons large portions of Western Russia had to 
accrue to Germany. On December 28, they submitted the first two 
articles of the preliminary peace which stated their willingness to 
evacuate all occupied Russian territory after the peace, but also 
demanded recognition that the populations of Lithuania, Courland, 
Eastern Livonia, and Poland desired secession from Russia. 
The 11 peace without annexations 11 was out the window. The 
disparity between the German and Russian concepts of self-determi-
nation were too great. December 28 saw the end of the first stage 
of negotiations. At the insistance of the Russians, who desired a 
general peace, it was agreed that a ten-day period would be allowed 
17 
in which the Entente could agree to join in negotiations. This period 
was to end on January 4, 1918. 
In Germany public opinion on the events of December 28 was 
divided. This time it was the Right which was jubilant and the Center 
and Left which were indignant. Being much more attuned to the 
mentality of the outside world because of their Catholic and inter -
national socialist connections, they knew that the apparent hypocrisy 
of the German policy would be used by the Entente to bring further 
onus on Germany. Prince Max of Baden wrote in his Memoirs: 
On twenty-eighth December, 1917, we made 
our irreparable mistake. We gave the impression 
to the whole world and to the German masses that 
in contrast to the Russian attitude, our agreement 
to the national right of self-determination was insin-
cere and that annexationists designs lurked behind 
't 22 1 • 
It was in this background of Brest-Litovsk that the Fourteen 
Points came into existence, The general situation required a 
definite formulation of Allied war aims and the German mistake at 
Brest was too g ood a propaganda opportunity to miss. So, on January 
5, 1918, in a little more than two hours of steady work, the Fourteen 
Points were drafted. Colonel House, the President's alter ego, was 
with him at the time. 
Much has been said and written about the strange nature of 
22 J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace, Brest-Litovsk, 
March 1918. (New York: W. Morrow & Co.), 1939. p. 127. 
18 
Woodrow Wilson. He has often been accused of messianic tendencies 
and his Calvinist background has often been brought up as an explana-
tion for his actions. But no matter what the impulses and motivations 
of this unusual man were, one thing can be said for him; he tried and 
came forth with something concrete and inclusive while others fumbled 
and engaged in platitudes. The Fourteen Points were the best 
formulation of peace aims which had been expressed during the war. 
It took three and a half years of blood-letting for the cards to be put 
on the table. 
But before January, 1918, various points touched upon by 
Wilson had been brought up by Entente and Central Powers statesmen 
and had been debated in the press of the various nations. On Decem-
her 18, 1916, before America's involvement in the war, the President 
had suggested to the belligerent powers the desirability of an early 
statement of their conceptions of the necessary terms of peace. In 
response, the Allies made a formal and detailed reply in which they 
named as necessary terms for peace the following: 
The restoration of Belgium , Serbia, and 
Montenegro, with compensations due them ; the 
evacuation of the invaded territories in France, 
Russia, and Roun,.ania, and with just reparation; 
the reorganization of Europe guaranteed by a stable 
regime and based at once on respect for nationalities 
and on the right to full security and liberty of econom-
ic development possessed by all peoples, small and 
great, and at the same time upon territorial conven-
tions and international settlements such as to 
guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified 
attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn 
from the Allies by force, or against the wish of their 
inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also 
of the Slavs, Roumanes, and Checho-Slovaks from 
foreign domination; the setting free of the populations 
subject to the b loody tyranny of the Turks; and the 
turning out of Europe of the Ottaman Empire as 
decidedly foreign to Western civilization. 23 
19 
In November, 1917, the prominent British Conservative and 
ex -Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, wrote a letter to the Daily 
Telegraph pleading for an early peace and giving his basis for it. 
I. Britain does not desire the annihilation 
of Germany as a Great Power; 
2. Britain does not seek to impose upon the 
German people any form of government other than 
that of their own choice; 
3. Britain does not desire to deny Germany 
of her place among the commercial powers; 
4. Britain is ready to discuss the question 
of the freedom of the seas; 
5. Britain desires an international agreement 
for the peaceful regulation of international disputes. 24 
These points of the Lansdowne letter were eagerly seized by those in 
Germany who were committed to a constructive German peace pro-
gram, such as Prince Max of Baden. 
The next month, on December 28, another statement was 
made in which war aims were listed; this time it was the Special 
23G. Harvey, 11 The Gensis of the Fourteen Commandments" 
North American Review, CCIX, February, 1919, p. 146. ' 
24Max of Baden, The Memoirs of Prince Max of Baden 
-- ----- - ~-- - :---=--' Trans. W. M. Calder and C. W. H. Sutton (2 vol., New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), I, 170. 
20 
National Labor Conference meeting at London which formulated a 
program. Among the points touched were 11 the suppression of secret 
diplomacy", hostility toward 11 all projects for an economic war't, the 
reparation by the German Government 11 of the "'.'rang admittedly done 
to Belgium11 , the undoing of 11the crime a gainst the peace of the 
wo:rld ... in 187 11', support of Italian claims, the freedom of the 
Bal kan people 11to settle their own destinies 11 , the nneutralizing11 of 
Armenia, Mesopotamia and Arabia, and the establishment of "a 
supranational authority, or League of Nations". 25 
Yet another statement was to be made before the famous 
Fourteen Points Speech. Before the Trades Union Congress on 
January 5, the same day that Wilson and House were drafting the 
Fourteen Points, Lloyd George outlined the followin g ideas: A limi-
tation of the "burden of armaments"; a solution of colonial problems 
which would regard 11the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants"; 
the support of 11 the new democracy of Russia" if the new rulers of 
Russia did not "take action independent of their Allies"; support of 
11 legitimate claims of the Italians"; the granting of 11 genuine self-
government11 to the Austro-Hungarian nationalities; 11 the restoration 
of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of Roumania11 ; the 
neutralization of the Dardanelles and the recognition of the "separate 
national conditions" of the non-Turkish nationalities in the Turkish 
25
Har vey, op. cit., pp. 147 -1 50. 
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Empire; the institution of an independent Poland; and, lastly, an 
attempt to 11 establish, by some international organization, an alterna-
tive to war as a means of settling international disputes 11 • 26 
When the news of the Lloyd George speech reached Wilson, 
he was, at first, inclined to abandon his own as superfluous. Wilson 
for a while 11 thought the terms which Lloyd George had given were 
so nearly akin to those he had worked out that it would be impossible 
for him to make the contemplated address before Congress 11 • 27 How-
ever, House was able to dissuade him and the address was delivered. 
The similarity between lJoyd George's and Wilson's ideas has led 
many to believe that the President based his on the Prime Minister's. 
We know by the documents that the President's address was already 
drafted when Lloyd George was speaking. It is not at all strange that 
two different men should deliver such similar speeches at approxi-
mately the same time independently of each other. They were both 
struggling with the same problems under similar circumstances. 
After all, these were the ideas which were floatin g around at that 
time. 
To make his speech, Wilson utilized a report which had been 
prepared by the Inquiry. The first part of the Inquiry's report 
26 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 
(6 vol., Boston: Little, Brown &t Company, 1936), Vol. V, pp. 67-72. 
27seymour, American Diplomacy, p. 28 7 . 
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outlined the diplomatic situation and the points which needed emphasis 
in the dip l omatic offensive against Germany. The President was 
urged to 
... show the way to Liberals in Great Britain and in 
France, and therefore restore their natural unity 
of purpose. The Liberals will readily accept the 
l eadership of the President, . if he undertakes a liber -
al dip lomatic offens ive, because they will find in 
that offensive an invaluable support for their internal 
d om e stic troubl es. 
The second part of the report consisted of a statement of 
terms on eight territo rial issues: Bel gium, Northern France, Alsace -
Lorraine, Italian frontiers, the Balkans, Poland, Austria-Hungary 
and Turkey. The report ended with a proposal to devel op the Allied 
nations into a L eague of Nations. 
Whether this League is to be armed and 
exclusive or whether there is to be a reduction of 
armaments and a cordial inclusion of Germany 
will depend upon whether the German Government 
is, in fact, representative of the German democracy. 28 
The Fourteen Points may be divided into two categories; 
those dealing with the construction of a new rational world order, or 
points of principle, and those dealing with readjustment of territories. 
Points One, Two, Three, Four, and Fourteen are of the former type, 
while Points Seven through Thirteen are of the latter. Points Five 
and Six have e l ements of both. 
Point One, calling for "open covenants of peace, openly 
28rbid. , p. 285. 
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arrived at 11 , was, of course, a concession to the new type of 
diplomacy which the Russians had instituted at Brest and a reaction 
to the disclosure of the II secret treaties". 
Point Two, which dealt with freedom of the seas, was of 
great import to blockaded Germany and also a statement of the 
principle for which the United States had gone to war. Wilson, how-
ever, was aware that this point would evoke British opposition. 
Point Three, which called for the removal of economic 
barriers, was of great interest to Germany for they felt very strongly 
the threat of economic war against them. This point caused Wilson 
much anxiety as he feared Senate opposition. 
Point Four, which called for disarmament, was acceptable 
in principle to all nations in a war-weary world. 
Point Five on the 
... absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based on a strict observance of the prin-
ciple that ... the interests of the populations concerned 
most have equal weight with the equitable claims of 
the government whose title is to be determined ... 
was ambiguous but of interest to Germany which wanted her colonies 
back. 
Point Six, which called for an evacuation of Russia and 
assistance 11 of every kind11 was written with special care, as it was 
in a sense the Russian problem which was the raison d'etre of the 
Wilsonian program. 
Point Seven, the restitution of Belgium, was of utmost 
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importance as it was a condi tio sine qua non of the Allies. 
Point Eight, on evacuation of French territory and ri ghting 
of the 11 wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 11 , caused Wilson a 
great deal of difficulty. The first draft of the points carried no 
reference to Alsace-Lorraine. A second draft was very ambiguous, 
11 ••• If Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France, Germany shoul d 
be given an equal opportunity. 1129 This point was only put in its 
final form on the day before the speech. However, its wording was 
indefinite, although Wilson later interpreted it himself as meaning 
the return of those provinces to France. 
Wilson must have had great qualms over this point. He was 
certainly aware that if his program floundered, it woul d be m ainly 
b ecause of the Alsace -Lorraine problem. Was he quite honest when 
the point was framed? Did he make it so indefinite in the hope that 
a compromise could be made? Was he guilty of faulty memory later 
when he interpreted the point definitively? Unfortunate l y, we will 
never know the answers to these questions. We can only surmise. 
Point Nine on Italian claims to Austrian territory, was a 
recognition of Italy's reason for fighting. 
Point Ten, which called for the autonomous development of 
the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was so framed 
that a break-up of the Empire was not c alled for. . This was a 
29Ibid., p. 286. 
recognition of the important role of the Dual Monarchy in Central 
Europe. 
Point Eleven, concerning the Balkans, was the only one 
which was shown to any representative of the Allied Governments 
before the speech was delivered. The head of the Serbian Mission 
in the United States, Vesnitch, criticized it because it did not call 
f th b l f t H . E . 30 or e rea c-up o the Aus ro- ungar1an mp1re. 
Point Twelve advocated the sovereignty of non-Turkish 
nationalities in the Turkish Empire and international control of the 
Dardanelles. This point was of great interest to Great Britain, 
France, and Russia, which were very conscious of their positions 
in the Middle East. 
Point Thirteen, on the establishment of an independent 
25 
Poland, was framed closely as possible to a declaration of the Polish 
National Council which had been presented to the Inter-Allied Confer -
ence in Paris. This point was of great personal interest to Colonel 
House because he was greatly influenced by Jan Paderewski who was 
acting as the American Agent for the Polish National Council. 
Lastly was Point Fourteen which called for the establishment 
of a "general association of nations" or League of Nations. This was 
an idea which had caused much com1nent on both sides since the be -
ginning of the war. As early as Autumn, 1915, Wilson was thinking 
30seymour, Intimate Papers, Vol. III, pp. 334-335. 
about a League of Nations. 
In the United States at that time, there was a League to 
Enforce Peace which sponsored the idea. Also, the letters of Sir 
Edward Grey, who advocated the idea, aroused Wilson's interest. 
26 
In a speech given on May 16, 1916, he had called openly for a League 
of Nations and on January 22, 191 7, had advocated a concert of 
nations to defend the rights of small nations. 31 This last point, then, 
had occupied the President's thoughts for son-ie time and eventually 
it became an idee-fixee for which some of the other points were 
modified. 
The speech was delivered before a joint session of Congress 
on January 8, 1918. The President opened by reviewing the Russian 
situation: 
The Russian representatives (at Brest-Litovsk) 
presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the 
principles upon which they would be willing to conclude 
peace ... The representatives of the Central Powers, 
on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, 
if much less definite, seemed susceptible to liberal 
interpretation until their specific program of practical 
terms was added. 
He continued by asking the Germans the most embarrassing 
questions: 
With whom are the Russian representatives 
dealing? For whom are the representatives of the 
Central Empire speaking? Are they speaking for the 
majorities of their respective parliaments or for the 
31 Seymour, American Diplomacy, p. 259. 
minority parties, that military and imperialistic 
m inority which has so far dominated their whole 
policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of 
the Bal kan States which have felt obliged to become 
their ass ociates in this war? 
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Then came words of sympathy and support for Russia and 
h e r people: 
They call to us to say what it is that we 
desire, in what if in anything our purpose and 
spirit differ from theirs, and I believe that the 
people of the United States w ou l d wish me to respond , 
with utter s implicity and frankness. Whether their 
present l eaders believe it or not, it is our heartfe l t 
desire and hope that some way may be opened where-
by we may be privileged to assist the peopl e of 
Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and 
ordered peace. 
Then, after a short justification of America 1 s role in the war, 
the Fourteen P oin t s were laid down. The speech ended on a note of 
reassurance to the German people: 
We have no jealousy of German greatness and 
there is no thing in this program that impa res it .. . . 
W e do not wish to i njure her or to b l ock in any way her 
legitimate influence or power . . . . We wish her only to 
accept a place of equality amon g the peoples of the world- -
the new world in which we now live- -instead of a place 
of mastery. 32 
In America, the speech was enthusiastically welcomed. The 
New York Tribune, an anti-Wilson paper, declared that 11 the Presi-
dent's words are the words of a h undred million ... Today, as never 
before , the whole nation marches with the President. 1133 
32Baker and Dodd, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 155 -1 6 2. 
3 3New York Tribune, Januar y 9, 1918. • 
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In England, France, and Italy, the enthusiasm was qualified 
by a realization that some of the terms, such as the points on freedom 
of the seas in England and Alsace -Lorraine in France, could be in-
terpreted unfavorably for those nations. 
The chief criticism which cautious thinkers 
r.nay be disposed to make upon it (referring to the 
President's speech), 
said the Times, 
is that, in its lofty flight to the ideal, it seems not 
to take sufficient account of certain hard realities 
of the situation .... Some of the proposals which Mr. 
Wilson puts forth almost appear to assume that the 
reign of righteousness upon the earth is already 
within our reach. 34 
The Russians at first were lukewarm but later became some -
what hostile. In that country, for which the speech was largely intend-
ed, millions of posters, handbills and pamphlets were distributed by 
American agents who were operating openly at that time. 
The reaction of the small national groups in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire was somewhat unfavorable. Thomas Masaryk, 
the Czech leader, considered Wilson's allusions to Austria-Hungary 
as pro-Austrian. 35 On one thing the Allies were agreed, however, 
the speech was a tremendous weapon in the diplomatic arsenal of the 
Entente. Even the Bolsheviks used it in their propaganda to their 
34
The Times, (London), January 19, 1918. 
3 5T. G. Masaryk, The Making ~f ':.. State (London: Frederic _, 
Stokes Company, 1927), p. 2b5. 
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prisoners-of-war and to German troops at the front. It s full e ffe ct 
on Germany was delayed, but nevertheless potent from the very 
beginning. 
CHAPTER II 
THE IMMEDIATE GERMAN REACTION 
TO THE FOUR TEEN POINTS 
January 1918 
In practically all sectors of German public opinion, the 
immediate reaction to Wilson's peace program was conditioned by 
two important factors. The first was the realization that his 
message of January 8 had im1nediate political purposes besides 
being a definite statement of war aims which could be used as a basis 
for peace negotiations. It must be remembered that the reaction was 
not only to the Fourteen Points as such, but also to the speech in which 
the points were framed. That speech had obviously three immediate 
purposes. The first was to influence the course of things at Brest-
Litovsk favorably for the Allies. The second was to heighten the 
political warfare within Germany by using the apparent contradiction 
between the December 24 and the December 28 statements at Brest. 
The third was to stiffen the war spirit of the Entente Liberals which 
was flagging due to the disillusionment caused by the 11 secret treaties 11 
disclosure. These purposes were not unrecognized by the Germans, 
as the press comment which follows will de1nonstrate. 
The second conditioning factor was the fact that Germans of 
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almost all factions resented deeply the previous public utterances of 
the An,.erican P resident, and considered America's entry into the 
-war as unjust and prompted by selfish interests. Wilson I s previous 
speeches were, therefore, as far as the Germans were concerned, 
sanctimonious and hypocritical--a proof of his bad faith. · His 
apparent change of emphasis, then, was in many quarters considered 
doubly dangerous. 
Added to the above was the fact that the speech had come 
only three days after that of Lloyd George and gave the appearance 
of some devious concerted plan on the part of the Allies. Despite 
the above factors, however, the reaction was varied, ranging from 
cautious and qualified approval to complete rejection and condemnation. 
The first reports of the speech appeared in the German 
-press on January 10, 1918, and the text was printed in part or in toto 
in most newspapers. Comment on the speech took the form in many 
cases of a continuation of earlier reaction to Lloyd George 1 s speech. 
The two speeches were often compared, aµd similarities and 
differences were stressed. The most favorable comment came from 
the Majority Socialist press. The official organ of the Social Demo-
crats, the Vorwaerts, in a long editorial, said: 
If Lloyd George 1 s speech greatly differed from 
the previous utterances of Entente leaders and especially 
his own warm-blooded utterances, that is still more the 
case with Wilson 1 s, which in comparison with his former 
pronouncements appears an example of statesmanlike 
moderation. Wilson's peace program is fine, despite 
many doubtful details, but the effect in Germany will be 
prejudiced by the excitement over his earlier speeches 
and by the mistrust that the speech is only a diplomatic 
maneuver to lure the Russian again into the bloody 
swamp of war ... The speech is not proof that the En-
tente is ready to conclude the peace which Wilson 
has outlined. Lloyd George's speech includes points 
discussable by the Central Powers, but not acceptable 
in the present form, which Wilson presents in an 
1 attenuated form. 
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The editorial went on to mention specifically the question 
of Alsace -Lorraine which could only be reconsidered if the attempt 
was renounced to alienate portions of the German people from the 
Reich. 
On the next day, an editorial in the san~e paper again brought 
up the German objection to alienation of any German territory in the 
east and west, but in general it was very receptive to the idea of 
using Wilson's program as a basis to start pourparlers. 
It is ridiculous to say that a danger of a 
general peace conference lies in the fact that the 
enemy would demand annexations at Germany's cost, 
and be able to realize these demands. We are pro-
tected therefrom by Wilson's promise, 11 We do not 
wish to injure Germany", as well as by Germany's 
·t· 2 strong pOSl lOn: 
It can be seen from the above comment that the official 
attitude of the Social Democrats was agreeable to the general condi-
tions set down in the Fourteen Points except those which concerned 
a possible separation from Germany of Alsace-Lorraine and Polish 
1vorwaerts, January 10, 191 8. 
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Prussia. The difference between the reception to Wilson's program 
and that afforded to Lloyd George I s was considerable. Wilson I s 
program was called fine (schoen), while the earlier program had 
been characterized as having "intrinsic imperialistic tendencies'.'. 
Other Socialist newspapers followed in somewhat the same 
vein, seeing in Wilson I s program a step forward. The mildly 
Socialist Munchener Post linked the speech with the ambivalent posi-
tion of the German Government. 
Wilson has with extraordinary cleverness 
seized upon the acute differences at present prevail-
ing in Germany over the peace question ~n order to 
shake the confidence of the German peace policy. 
The . contradictions existing between the declarations 
of December 25 and December 28 show that a life -
and-death struggle is now proceeding between the 
peace Majority of July and the military annexationist 
party. Even now we do not know what party the 
Imperial Government has decided to support, and 
inconceivable confusion prevails in the direction of 
German foreign policy. At a moment when conditions 
of the East are pressing for a rapid and firm decision, 
Egyptian darkness enshrouds the real peace aims of 
the German Government. Before Wilson's demands 
can be discussed, however, the Government must 
declare whether it is striving fo r a peace without 
annexation or for a peace with military guaranties. 3 
The Mannheimer Volkstimrne found the Wilsonian program 
acceptable in part and said that heavy concessions on both sides were 
necessary before peace negotiations could be opened. It also saw in 
Wilson's use of the Brest-Litovsk situation a pressing reason for a 
3Munchener Post, January 10, 1918. 
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German return to the December 25 basis of negotiation in the East. 4 A 
thoughtful editorial appeared in the Schwaebische Tagwacht of 
January 10. It pointed out the uniqueness of the Fourteen Points as 
being the first attempt of the Entente to formulate war aims clearly. 
The paper found the points basically different from Lloyd George's 
program. 
This is a document of the highest political 
importance, being the first manifesto by any Govern-
ment opposed to the Central Powers in which an 
attempt is made to state with clearness the war aims 
of the Entente .... it seems to us that no single point 
of Wilson's program is so worded as to make negotia-
tion impossible. It is true his demands for the 
separation of the Polish provinces of Germany and 
Austria, and the surrender of Alsace -Lorraine can-
not be accepted by the Central Powers but Wilson does 
not say these demands must be fulfilled as a condition 
sine qua non. We dispense with discussions of details, 
whichagrnably differ in tone from his earlier utter -
ances, and confine ourselves to saying that the tone 
and contents of the document constitute an important 
step toward accommodation with the Central Powers, 
and the Russian Revolution, and that tt is unintelligible 
to us how the Pan-German papers can call it a new 
edition of Lloyd George's speech on war aims. We see 
very :material differences of intention and contents be-
tween the two speeches; in fact, we consider Wilson 1 s 
message as an open disavowal of Lloyd George's war 
speech. We deem it only possible, but necessary for 
the Central Go? ernments to examine in all seriousness 
the question whether Wilson I s message cannot form a 
bridge on which the two hostile groups can meet for 
direct discussion. In no case can any questions of form 
be permitted to stand in the way of such an examination. 
This was, of course, a highly sophisticated view of the situation and 
4Mannheimer Volk stimme, January 10 , 19 18. 
sun-nned up very succinctly the views of many Germans who were 
sensitive enough to realize the true import of Wilson's message. 
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Not all of the Soci a list press was as receptive as the a b ove 
comment w ou l d indi cate. The Hamburger Echo lashed out at the 
Pan - Germans and militarists for pr o v i d ing Wilson the opportuni ty 
of splitti ng German y down the m i ddle. It thereby pointed up the 
destruc t i ve warlike nature of the speech rather than its constructive 
or peace-engendering qualities . 
Wilson never spoke so well-informedly or so 
falsely. The message shows him as a peace and war 
angel. He is better info rmed than last summer, but 
apparently has read only Pan-German papers. The 
National Party which all decent Germans merely scorn, 
has operated more effectively abroad and has furnish -
ed weapons to the enemy. The military party shoul d be 
called the war party which wants no peace of under -
s t andi ng. But such parti es exist in all countries, and, 
recognizing this, Wilson I s sc o rnful question concern-
ing whom the German delegates at Brest represent 
deserves calm rejection. Wilson ' s main object is a 
political offensiv,e with an expected effect on the German 
people. It serves, however, to strengthen Germany's 
connection to its Allies. The pea<ee program is based 
upon the Central Powers ' defeat and includes no word 
of an indemni ty to Greece or the right of self-determi-
n a t ion for Irel and. Wilson would like to hear German 
demands contradicti n g this, so that he might leav e the 
responsib ility for the contrivance of the war on Ger -
many. The falseness of the peace program which begins 
with declarations every one could agree to, is shown by 
its one-sidedness. 5 
Thus we see the German sensitivity crop up. Perhaps it was a reaction 
5 Hamburger Echo, January 10, 1918. 
based on a guilt feeling, especially over Belgium, that caused this 
paper to bring up such irrelevant things as an indemnity to Greece 
and freedom for Ireland in a peace settlement. The fact remains 
that among leftist and moderate groups such a feeling existed and 
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to irritate it often evoked hostility. To the Germans, Wilson was all 
to o raady to cast out the mote in the German eye. 
Prince Alexander von Hohenlohe, the German Pacifist 
leader, was impressed by the speech. From Switzerland, where he 
conducted his activities during the war, he came forth with a proposal 
to overcome the great stumbling block of Alsace-Lorraine. He noted 
editorially in the Neue Zuricher Zeituing that Wilson's references to 
Aleace-Lorraine were expressed in general terms and suggested 
that the question might possibly be settled by guarantees of far-
reaching autonomy or a referendum. 
In any case, the door is open to negotiations 
on this point, but the demand for a new Poland, in-
cluding all Polish territory, is entirely unacceptable 
to Germany, as Posen lies at the Gates of Berlin. 
In conclusion, he observed: 
The peace negotiations have begun not merely 
at Brest Litovsk but on the question of a general peace. 
They are not proceeding at a green table under diplo-
matic secrecy, but before the whol e world through 
speeches appearing in the newspapers. Perhaps this 
modern method will reach the end more quickly. In 
any event, stones that are rolling cannot be held back. 
War profiteers, war fanatics may shriek; munitions 
capitalists may employ their billions to poison public 
opinion in the effort to prolong the war, but there is 
one thing stronger than all the billions, more powerful 
than the sword, and that is the spirit of peace coming 
from all nations, which nothing can withstand. 
President Wilson's message may gain an honorable 
place in history as the cause of the nations turning 
back on the way to the abyss. 6 
Further favorable comment came from the liberal Frankfurter 
3 7 
Zeitung which found that Wilson I s peace program was prompted "by 
the plain desire to have peace, if possible, without further bloodshed". 
A great resemblance between Wilson's and Lloyd George's speeches 
was noted in their moderate tone and disavowal of the intention to 
destroy Germany. As for the points themselves, the paper found 
Point Five vague and the Alsace-Lorraine statement obscure. 
For us the possession of Alsace-Lorraine 
is not wrong, but an indispensible condition of our 
national integrity and freedom. We believe that 
Lloyd George and Wilson purposely used language 
susceptible of another interpretation than the terri-
torial adhesion of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and 
the disappointment in Frace bears us out .... Apart 
from the vagueness and the wording of the demand 
respecting Turkey and the Balkans, the program 
contained a number of points acceptable to Germany 
and her allies as a basis of peace negotiations. 
Other demands are unacceptable and it seems as if 
the President who formulates them is too little 
conscious of whom he is addressing and the actual 
results produced by the World War. 7 
Even the editors of this enlightened organ were sensitive to what they 
considered Wilson's presumptuousness and were impressed by the 
apparently ex cellent position of German anns at that time. 
6Neue Zuricher Zeitung, January 11, 1918. 
7 Frank furter Zeitung, January 10, 1918 . 
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Another liberal organ, the Munchener Neuste Nachrichten, 
saw the message as an attempt to influence the Russian and German 
peoples and therefore doubly dangerous and requiring careful treat-
ment by Germany. 
It is essential that a clear and unequivocal 
reply giving Germany's war aims be m 'ade. The 
message is intended to confuse the Bolsheviks and 
the German people. It is evident how excellently 
the recent Pan-German maneuvers have aided Wilson 
in distinguishing between the constitutional govern-
ment and the military party. Many of Wilson's 
conditions are acceptable, others are too vague to 
allow positive answers. It is certain that Germany 
cannot unconditionally evacuate the occupied terri-
tory before the conclusion of peace, and the only 
acceptable solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question 
is that Germany voluntarily grant the country a Con-
stitution giving her full equality with the other 
German States. The conditions regardin0 Poland 
are unacceptable, while Italy can hope only for the 
restitution of the position before the war. Austria 
will effect her own autonomy constitutionally, and 
this cannot be a peace condition, while the autonomy 
of non-Turkish nationalities under Turkish sovereignty 
is probably acceptable. Count Bertling, (the German 
Chancellor), ·must make an immediate and unequivocal 
reply to President Wilson's 1nessage and prove to him 
that Germany must not be mistaken for some South 
American country where the internal and foreign policy 
of the country is made known through military pronuncia-
mentos. 8 
Perhaps the author of the above comment was writing with 
tongue in cheek, for the irony of the situation was, as events soon 
proved, that the state of the civil governrnent in Germany had indeed 
sunk to the level of a South American country. 
8Munchener Neuste Nachrichten, January 10, 1918. 
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As we move from left to right, the press reaction became 
less favorable. The papers of the Center, those which supported the 
gove rnment, became uniformly suspicious of and hostile to the speech, 
although they recognized some slight virtue in it. 
The speech brings everything to the French 
and British which they wish, namely, support in 
their claims to Alsace -Lorraine and fulfilhnent of 
English plans of conque stion in Asia Minor, 
said the liberal Berliner Tageblatt of January 10. 
Many of the fourteen peace articles Germany could 
absolutely subscribe to, 
continued that paper, 
such as disarmament, the League of Nations, freedom 
of the seas, and no secret diplomacy; but these aims 
are unrealized if hatred and bitterness are piled up and 
if the Americans are determined to fight to the end for 
the Entente annexationists I solution of territorial 
questions. 
The Germania, the official organ of the Center Party, took the oppor-
tunity offered by the Vorwaerts comment to attack the Social Demo-
crats. Quoting out of text, it said: 
The Vorwaerts call this speech 11 an example 
of statesmanlike moderation11 • We are of another 
opm1on. 1t 1 s true that Wilson doesn 1t talk so big 
today as one is used to hear him do. But, all in all, 
he acts as though he was the victor over a beaten 
Germany. Therefore, the message, which should 
be highly regarded in war -frenzied America, makes 
upon us as little an impression as his earlier 
speeches,9 
9Germania, January 10, 1918. 
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The other leading organ of the Center Barty, the Koelnische 
Volkszeitung, which had followed a pro-annexationist policy all during 
the war, was even more hostile than the Germania. 
We cannot consider it the duty of the German 
press, 
stated this paper, 
faithfully to print every word that comes from the 
lips of this puffed-up fellow, except when practical 
considerations and German interests are concerned. 
This refusal is the more justified toward his latest 
message, since it contains insolent insinuations 
which do not possess the slightest actual value. 
The above was given as an explanation of the paper I s failure to print 
Wilson's speech in full. In further comment, the paper found the 
two speeches of the .Allied statesmen complimentary and rejected out-
of-hand the proposals on Alsace-Lorraine and Poland. It interpreted 
Point Eight as requiring the 11 severance from the German Empire of 
Alsace -Lorraine, which is nine-tenths inhabited by Germans. ,tlO 
The semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung called 
the speech 11 a symphony of will to no peace" and considered the speec h 
11 
an attempt to "divide the people (German) into two camps 11 • The 
Vossiche Zeitung, the oldest newspaper in Berlin and fairly liberal, 
entitled its editorial, 11 The Anglo-Saxon Menace 11 • 
Whoever wishes to draw his conclusions from 
1°Koelnische Volkszeitung, January 10, 1918. 
11
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 11, 1918. 
the sympathetic and close cooperation of the two 
Anglo-Saxon powers will see in Wilson 1s peace 
message an absolutely necessary tactical supple-
ment to the Saturday speech of Lloyd George ... 
Naturally the proposal of Wilson concerning Bel-
gium agrees with Lloyd George 1 s. His formula 
for the solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question 
is just as equivocal as Lloyd George's ... The key 
to the difference between the American and the 
English formula lies in the greater role which 
Wilson assigns to the proposed League of Nations. 12 
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If the moderates in Germany were unable to see much virtue 
in Wilson's speech of January 8, the Pan-Germans and annexationists 
responded even more unfavorably. Some of the more moderate annexa-
tionist papers, such as the Kreuz Zeitung tried to be detached and 
unemotional in their analysis. For instance, the Kreuz Zeitung con-
sidered the 1nessage as aimed at the Russians and being 11 substantially 
the same as Lloyd George 1 s. It is ridiculous for him to say 11 , the 
paper continued, "that his program contains nothing prejudicial to 
Germany 1 s greatness. 11 The editorial then asked for a refutation of 
Wilson 1 s distinction between the German people and the military party 
by the Government• s avoidance of friction between the military and 
political authorities. 13 
Much of the press comment from the right was not as moder-
ate as the above. To a great extent it was monotonous and primiti-
vistic, showing only rare glimpses of light and understanding, and 
12vossische Zeitung, January 10, 1918. 
13 Z 't J 10 1918 Kreuz el ung, anuary , . 
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these moments of understanding appear to be only accidental. The re 
seems to run a strain of paranoic distrust and hate of all opposition, 
both foreign and domestic. 11All in all there is nothing new in Wilson's 
R1essage 11 , said the Deutsche Tagezeitung, a Berlin daily representing 
North Germ.an agricultural interests. According to the editorial , the 
speech showed that Wilson believed that the Reichtag Majority 
(Hungerfriedensmehrheit or Hunger Peace Majority, as they called 
it) could be used as the instrument of Germany's enemies. 14 On 
January 11, the Deutsche Zeitung of Berlin, an annexationist daily, 
took the opportunity presented by the Vorwaerts article to attack the 
anti-annexationist parties. Under the headline "An Echo of Scheide-
mannism in Wilson's Message", that paper said: 
By their fruits shall ye know them! One 
fruit of Scheidemannism or, what is practically the 
same, Erzbergerism and Kuehlmannism, shows in 
Wilson's newest speech. The main point is: Wilson 
greets the leaders of the Reichstag Majority of July 
19 as his allies (Bundesgenossen), as advocates of 
the same true democratic peace the representative 
and champion of which he claims to be. The good 
will that the party of Scheidemann gains thereby so 
pleases the Vorwaerts that it shows its thanks by 
praising the 11 fine and attractive peace program" 
that Wilson has disclosed ... it is true that to all ap-
pearances it does not like the return of Alsace -
Lorraine to France. The Vorwaerts does not want 
that to happen entirely unconditionally. And what 
is more, it considers Wilson's speech as an example 
of statesmanlike moderation ... As long as Wilson and 
his allies can depend upon Scheidemann I s Social-
Democracy as well as on a German Government party 
14Deutsche Tagezeitung, January 10, 1918. 
they will not stop considering our government 
as weak and keep encouraging themselves to 
continue the war until Germany is annihilated. 
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The sensation-mongering Lokal Anzeiger of Berlin termed 
the message as a peace program full of hypocrisy. It was aimed, so 
it claimed, at the reorganization of the world so that Germany would 
sink to a power of the second rank after having been deprived of 
three provinces, which owed their wealth and prosperity to German 
civilization and labor. 15 The industrialist Koelnische Zeitung 
interpreted the Fourteen Points Speech and Lloyd Gear ge I s speech 
as attempts to influence the Russian situation: 
The Russians are about to sign a separate 
peace and become friends of the Quadruple Alliance. 
One must pretend to be generous and full of love for 
humanity and try to hamper the matter -of-fact 
negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in order to hearten 
the weak ... For this reason only have Wilson and 
Lloyd George Spoken. Fortunately, h owever, in-
trigues and machinations do not bring world peace, 
but deeds and decisive blows . The latter have 
br ought us to meet the Russians at Brest-Litovsk, 
and we shall pick there the fruit that is ripe. 16 
The National Liberal Magdeburgische Zeitung, another 
annexationist organ, called the message 11 the height of arrogance", 
but considered it and the Lloyd George speech as productive of good 
effects in Germany as they would help to open the eyes "of idealists 
in Germany to the fact that no impression can be made on a phalanx 
15Loka1Anzeiger, January 11, 1918. 
16K oelnische Zeitung, January 11, 1918. 
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like the Entente by means of kindness and sentimentality11 • 17 Other 
annexationist papers were equally unreceptive. The Hamburger 
Nachrichten on January 10 blasted the opposition in its comment: 
Wilson speaks scornfully of German peace 
offers and peace feelers and open attempts to play 
the Reichstag Majority against the military authorities - -
the Reichstag Majority which is England 1 s tool in the 
diplomatic war against Germany. Its business is to 
serve enemy ends, as is plainly evidenced from Wilson's 
peace program. However, the resolution of July l 7 
(July 19) demands no annexations and no indemnities 
while Wilson's program demands indemnities to France 
and Belgium and the alienation of Alsace-Lorraine and 
Prussian and Austrian provinces, Serbian access to 
the sea of Austrian expense, and the partition of Turkey, 
in fact, annexations in all directions. Then came 
cryptic words about controlling waters by international 
treaty ... Wilson demands that the Reichstag Majority 
treasonably betray their brothers-in-arms, so that fo.e 
Entente may accompli sh their predatory war aims. 
Wilson's speech is a warning which shows where the 
false policy of the Reichstag Majority has brought 
Germany. 
Its editorial of the next day commented that the phrase in Point Two 
about exceptions to freedom of the seas said not whether these 
exceptions inc luded the North Sea and the Baltic, two bodies of water 
in which a Hamburg newspaper would have great interest. This 
second editorial again attacked the Reichstag Majority. 11 Gerinan 
democracy and Social Democracy welcome such meddling (Wilson's 
attempt to influ ence German internal affairs) as allies'', maintained 
the paper, "which show how burningly necessary in Germany is a 
17Magdeburgische Zeitung, January 10, 191 8. 
firm hand sure of its goal. 11 The paper finished by demanding 
annexations. 
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The above comments contain the meat of the right - wing 
reaction to the January rnessage. To the military annexationists, 
Wilson's words were a trap to be avoided, a trap which was all the 
more dangerous because of the universal appeal of their high 
sounding phrases. It was aimed specifically at encouraging the 
Russians to continue to fight and thus deprive Germany of her gains 
in the East. It was also considered to be an encouragement to the 
Majority parties to continue and strengthen their activities toward 
concluding what was to the Right a treasonable peace. 
After the first few days, editorial comment on the Fourteen 
Points died out in the German press. Most attention at this time was 
being paid to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. It took the official 
replies of the German and Austro-Hungarian governments to revive 
discussion on the points. 
These answers to the speeches of Lloyd George and Wilson 
were made on the same day, January 24. Before the 1nain committee 
of the Reichstag, the Imperial Chancellor, Count Hertling, outlined 
his government's views while the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, 
Count Czernin, did the same before the Austrian Reichsrat. The 
bearded septagenarian in Berlin, after some preli1ninary remarks 
about Brest-Litovsk, proceeded to comment on each of the points. 
On the First Point he said, "History shows that it is we, above all 
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others, who would be able to agree to foregoing publicity of diplomatic 
agreements. 11 This point was acceptable. 
Point Two, freedom of the seas, met with German approval. 
The Chancellor took the stand, however, that such freedom was im-
possible while England controlled the internation water routes with 
its strategic bases. The removal of economic barriers as stated in 
Point Three was also acceptable as was Point Four concerning dis -
armament. On Point Five, the settlement of all colonial claims and 
disputes, the Chancellor declared that some difficulties would be 
encountered in realizing this claim, and that England should be induced 
to make clear her position. The Sixth Point, which dealt with the 
problem out of which the Wilson message had sprung, Russia, was 
unacceptable to the German Government as, since the Allies had 
eschewed the opportunity of joining negotiations, the eastern peace 
was now a matter between Russia and the Central Powers solely. 
The Belgium question, as embodied in Point Seven, was one 
which was to be settled at the peace conference, although the Chan-
cellor did disclaim any intention of annexation. On the French 
situation, Point Eight, the Chancellor had this to say: 
The occupied parts of France are a valuable 
pawn in our hands. Here, too, forcible annexation 
also forms no part of official German policy. The 
conditions and methods of procedure to be adopted in 
the evacuation, which must take into account Germany's 
vital interests, must be agreed upon betwe:e.n Germany 
and France. I can only again express by accentuating 
the point that there can never be any question of the 
dismemberment of the In,perial qerman territo~y. 
Under no fine phrases of any kind shall we permit 
the enemy to take the Reichsland fron~ us, which 
has ever more intimately linked itself to Germanism, 
and which has in a h ighly gratifying manner and 
ever increasing measure developed in the economic 
respect and at the present time more than 87 per 
cent of the population of the Rhineland speak the 
German mother tongue. 18 
Thus we have stated officially what must have been the deepest 
4 7 
feelings of the majority of Germans outside Alsace-Lorraine itself. 
It was this question, namely Alsace -Lorraine, which had been in the 
past, was at the time of the presentation of the Fourteen Points, and 
would be in the future, the greatest stumbling block to peace. 
Points Nine, Ten, and Eleven, which dealt with the Italian 
frontiers and the question of nationalities in the Dual Monarchy and 
the various Balkan States, Hertling left to the Austro-Hungarian 
For eign Minister to answer, reiterating, however, · that where German 
interests were involved that nation would "vig orously defend them" and 
stressed German solidarity with the Dual Monarchy. As for the 
Turkish question embodied in Point Twelve, Germany considered 
the integrity of the Turkish Empire her concern. The Imperial 
Chancellor assured Turkey of support, especially in the question of 
the Straits. On the Thirteenth Point, the unification of Poland, the 
Chancellor stated that such was already the case for the Central 
Powers had liberated the Poles from Tsarisn~ and a kingdom had 
18vorwaerts, January 2 5 , 1918. 
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been established. The last point, the proposal for a League of Nations, 
was acceptable and the Chancellor specifically observed: 
As regards to this point, I am sympathetically 
disposed, as my past political activity shows, toward 
every idea which eliminates for the future the possibility 
and probability of wars, and which will promote peace 
and harmonious collaboration between nations. If the 
idea of an association of nations, as suggested by Presi-
dent Wilson, proves on closer examination to be really 
conceived in a spirit of complete justice, and compl ete 
impartiality toward all alike, then the Imperial Govern-
ment is g lad l y ready, after all other pending questions 
have been settled, to begin the examination of the basis 
of such an association of nations. 19 
After some brave words in which the favorable military 
situation was noted and the exploits of the military were praised, the 
Chancellor asked that both Lloyd George and Wilson should come 
forth with new proposals. Although many of the proposals of the two 
Allied statesmen were acceptable, others were too vague and had to 
be made more concrete before they could be considered .. 
While Count Bertling was addressing the Main Committee of 
the Reichstag, Count Czernin made hisanswerto the Austrian Reichsrat. 
From the moment that the Fourteen Points were published, he had 
realized their true potential and had decided to take the first oppor -
tunity to make a conciliatory gesture. ZO The January 24 speech was 
that opportunity. The Foreign Minister on Point One expressed 
l9Ibid. 
200. Czernin, In The World Nar (New York: Harper and 
- ~ ...,-;"7 Brothers, Publishers, 19201, pp. 209-2 lo. 
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''serious doubts" as to whether open d iplomacy was "always the most 
practical and quickest way to reach a result. 11 He approved of Points 
Two, Three, and Four and had no comment to make on P oint Five. 
To Point Six, he replied that Austria-Hungary had no desire for 
Russian territory, and on Point Seven he said, 
So far as these possessions concern her allies, 
whether in the case of German possessions, Be l gium 
or Turkey, Austria-Hungary, faithful to her engage-
ments, will go to the extreme in defense of her a.Hies. 
She will defend the pre -war possessions of her allies 
as she would her own. 2 1 
The Eighth Point was not discussed by Count Czernin as it 
was strictly a point concerni ng Germany. His avoidance of taking a 
stand on this all important point was obvi ous l y for the purpose of 
keeping the matter open for discussion in any possible negotiations. 
To the Ninth Point he gave, quite naturally, a negative answe r . The 
same was done with Point Ten and Eleven. Point Twelve had already 
been covered in his answer to Feint Seven. 
To the Thirteenth Point he con1mented , 11 We also are 
supporters of the creation of an independent Polish State. 11 The last 
point was acceptabl e to the Foreign Minister and he said of it, "In 
this idea of a League of Peoples the President would probably m.eet 
with no opposition in this monarchy. 1122 
21 vorwaerts, January 25, 1918. 
22 Ibid. 
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Despite the apparent adverse reaction to many of the points, 
the Foreign Minister's speech was actually a bid for the opening of 
negotiations. In line with his plan, the most significant part of the 
speech was in its conclusion. 
Austria-Hungary and the United States practically 
agree, and not only in great principles with regard to 
the new arrangement of the world after the war. Our 
views are approaching on several concrete questions. 
The differences, I think, are not so great that discussion 
about these points should not lead to a clarification. The 
situation accordingly is that Austria-Hungary and the 
United States are two belligerents whose interests are 
less incompatible than they seem. It is obvious to me 
that an exchange of views between the two countries 
might form a starting point for conciliat-ory discussions 
between all the states which have not yet entered into 
peace negotiations. 23 
In Berlin a parliamentary debate followed the Chancellor I s 
speech in which the various party leaders ex pressed their own 
opinions and the positions of their individual parties. Karl Trimborn, 
a Center Party deputy, welcomed the speech in its entirety. Scheide -
mann for the Social Democrats had some caustic statements to make. 
The speaker speaks (referring to a part of 
the Chancellor I s speech} of the success of the U -boat 
war. It is true that it is not without results, but the 
surest success was the entry of Arne rica into the 
ranks of our enemies. America has now taken Russia's 
place ... The Wilsonian message offers in most of its 
points a unified groundwork for negotiations. Only two 
strife filled questions remain; Alsace-Lorraine must 
remain German .... We must find a solution for Turkey 
without being unfaithful to our trust .... Should we con-
tinue the war just because we don't want to negotiate 
23 Ibid. 
over Poland .... We just don't understand (referring 
to the Social Democrats) if the enemy has contemptu -
ously refused our own peace proposals, we must not 
fall into the same error or we will be to blame. No 
one says that we should accept the Wilsonian pro-
posals without investigating them. The conditions 
are still here to reach an understanding. On both 
sides illusions must be given up and things must be 
seen as they are. The complete restitution of 
Belgium is our duty, naturally on conditions that 
the enemy respect the integrity of German territory. 
In the speech of the Imperial Chancellor one finds 
a clever diplo1nat but no statesman. 24 
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On the second day of the debate, Count Kuna Westarp of the 
Conservative Party said, 
The Conservative P arty agrees with the 
Centrum, Progressives, and National-Liberals, 
as well as with the Chancellor, that the speeches 
of Lloyd George and Wilson do not form a suitable 
basis for peace negotiations in the west. 25 
Erzberg er of the Center Party interpreted the Chancellor I s 
speech quite differently than did Westarp. He saw in it a beginning 
of negotiations but was not entirely pleased with its contents . Before 
the Reichstag he observed: 
Peace can only be had by way of under -
standing. The differences between Wilson and 
Lloyd George are still very great, and the Chan-
cellor rightly addresses himself more to Wilson 
than to Lloyd George. Bertling' s speech was in 
fact the opening of conversations between statesmen. 
Czernin 1s speech does not conflict with Hertling's 
but develops it further; it is to be hoped new pro-
posals will soon come. Why could not something 
24neutsche Zeitung , January 25, 1918. 
25Ibid. 
positive be said about the Belgian question instead 
of a negative statement:? Naturally we have a free 
hand, but it is well to say what we wish to make of 
this freedom ... If no peace accommodation comes 
now, it is again demonstrated that the Entente is 
to blame. 26 
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The press reaction to the speeches of the twenty-fourth of 
January again varied with the political coloration of the newspaper. 
In general, the libe·ral press saw in the Chancellor's speech a 
masterpiece of equivocation and in the Foreign Minister I s a ray of 
hope. The moderate press found both Hertling's and Czernin's 
answers to Lloyd George and Wilson satisfactory and complimentary, 
while the rightist press sometimes commented unfavorably on the 
Chancellor's speech and saw no virtue in the Foreign Minister's. 
The Vorwaerts of January 25 had this to say: 
To any journalist of average ability it is 
a very easy matter to interpret the Chancellor's 
speech as a concession to annexationism or, if 
he chooses, as an extremely peace-loving mani-
festo. In this respect it is absolutely a masterpiece ... 
In somewhat the same vein the Mannheimer Volkstimme observ ed: 
The Chancellor failed absolutely in the two 
main objects required, first, to counteract the 
excellent impression left in the neutrals and the 
English and Entente peoples by Lloyd George and 
Wilson; second, to make a clear declaration re -
garding the Central Powers I war aims ... Bertling 
should have briefly and emphatically declared that 
Germany still holds to the Reichstag Re solution, 
and while unable to accept all of Lloyd George's 
and Wilson's proposals, finds them a sufficient 
basis for immediate peace negotiations. 2 7 
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The Schwaebische Tagwacht found the two statemen I s 
speeches complhnentary, although the Imperial Chancellor had not 
spoken clearly on the situation. 
Unfortunately it cannot be said that the 
Chancellor I s speech brought the clarity expected 
by the German people ... The best th.at can be said 
of Hertling I s speech is that it has at least not 
s l ammed the doors leading to negotiations and has 
not actually destroyed the existing peace possibili-
ties. Czernin I s speech materially supplements 
Hertling I s. His suggestion of an exchange of views 
between Austria and America can hardly be made 
without the knowledge of the German Chaocellor, 
so that it must be considered as a declaration of 
the readiness of the Central Powers to enter peace 
conversations on the basis of Wilson's message ... 
it would have helped matters a great deal if the 
German Chancellor had given unequivocal expres-
sion of the same intentions as Czernin. 28 
Frain Switzerland Prince Hohenlohe viewed the Foreign 
Minister's speech as making a good impression but added, "It would 
nevertheless be an illusion to believe peace is very near. Count 
Czernin I s own words prove he himself is under no such i llusion. 1129 
In the liberal press Hertling I s reply was not always greeted 
with unreserved comrnendation. The Frankfurter Zeitung commented: 
The speeches of Hertling and Czernin leave 
2 7 Mannheimer Volkstimme, January 2 5, 1918. 
28schwaebische Tagewacht, January 25, 1918 . 
29Neue Zuricher Zeitung, January 26, 1918. 
the impression that the way to peace is open, How-
ever, the speech of the Chancellor has not brought 
the clarity necessary to thwart the efforts of the 
annexationist politicians (Gewaltpolitiker). 11 30 
Similarly the Muenchener Neuste Nachrichten observed: 
Wilson's message showed a desire to dis-
cover a basis for agreement. The Chancellor 
should have formulated his answer clearly and 
promptly, This he has not actually succeeded in 
accomplishing. 31 
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Theodor Wolff, the Editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, viewed Czernin I s 
reply as a moderating force which might bring Hertling's and Wilson's 
views closer to each other. 
Czernin' s statement that an exchange of 
views between Austria and Ainerica might form a 
basis for conciliatory pourparlers between all 
belligerent nations at war will undoubtedly 
strengthen the umnistakabl y increasing peace 
movements in Ainerica, and may even suffice to 
weaken the obstructive effects of Hertling's 
speech and strengthen its part which makes for 
peace; for it is plain to anybody that there is a 
long distance between Wilson's points and Hert-
ling' s points ..... Hertling's speech alone will 
scarcely conjure up peace, but it is possible that 
Czernin may yet lead Bertling there too. 32 
Thus we see that liberal comment was not pleased with the failure of 
Bertling to be more receptive to Wilson's points, although it did not 
accuse him of being equivocal. 
3 °Frankfurter Zeitung, January 25, 1918. 
3 1 
Munchene r N euste N achrichten, January 2 5, 19 18. 
32 Berliner Tageblatt, January 25, 1918. 
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As was to be expected, the moderate press showed pleasure 
in the two statemen' s speeches. The Germania considered the 
speeches as an indication that negotiations for a general peace had 
already begun , while the Koelnische Volkszeitung followed suit by 
observing: 
The impression that certain relations are 
being established between Vienna and Washington 
is strengthened when one recalls that both Bertling 
and Czernin exhaustively discussed Wilson's 
message. Whether or not the two statesmen in 
Berlin and Vienna had special reason for devoting 
so much attention to that message is beyond the 
knowledge of the pub lic. But if in Vienna they are 
reckoning with the possibility of reaching any under-
standing between the Western and the Central Powe rs 
through Wilson, then it stands to reason that Wilson's 
Fourteen Points are not regarded as the minimum 
conditions from which the President and his Allies 
would under no circumstances depart, for as they 
stand they are in part quite unacceptable to the 
Central Powers. This view has been expressed in 
Berlin as well as in Vienna. 
The paper continued by speculating on the reasons for Wilson's 
formulation of the points: 
If we look for the reasons why Wilson actually 
seeks to make that possible which previously he had 
maintained was impossible, these must be found in 
the more than ever hopeless war prospects of the En-
tente and in the growing longing for peace in the 
countries. That Wilson, on account of his great 
influence in the Entente councils is in a position to 
throw his word as a decisive weight into the Entente 
war scales, is common knowledge to all who re -
member the b oundless expectations which ~reeted the 
entrance of the United States into the war. 3 
33Koelnische Volkszeitung, January 27, 1918, 
-
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The Norddeutsche Zeitung said that Hertling gave a clear explanation 
of German policy in his speech and that the nation stood behind the 
Chancellor. 
34 
The Vossische saw cooperation between the Central 
Powers' Foreign Ministries in Czernin's offer to negotiate. 
35 
While the moderate press was pleased with the two speeches 
and considered them complimentary, the annexationist press saw in 
Count Czernin's speech a feature detrimental to Germany. The 
Deutsche Tageszei tung thundered, "Czernin' s offer of a separate 
negotiation to the United States can only be taken as an imperilment 
of Germany's vital interests. 113 6 The Hamburger Nachrichten 
observed: 
Czernin is not immediately concerned with 
Germany's interests, but ought not to oppose 
Austro-Hungarian interests to Germany ' s which he 
does in declaring Wilson I s proposals acceptable to 
Austria -Hungary. 3 7 
The Taegliche Rundschau was more caustic than the above papers. 
Victorious Germany, which has born the 
heaviest burdens of the war is therefore in tow 
of Austria, which is to negotiate a Wilson peace 
for Germany. Could anything worse be expected 
of a collapsed Germany? We reject the proposed 
division of labor - -Germany to carry on the war 
and assurne its burdens, and Austria to carry on 
34Norddeutsche Zeitung, January 25, 1918. 
35vossische Zeitung, January 25, 1918. 
36neutsche Tagesz.eitung,January 25, 1918. 
37 6 Hamburger Nachrichten, January 2 , 1918. 
peace negotiations with Wilson, Germany's worst 
enemy. Agreement between Vienna and Washing-
ton is confirmed by the fact that both Hertling and 
Czernin took up Wilson's message in detail. The 
public doesn't know whether Berlin and Vienna 
statesmen had special reasons for devoting so 
much attention to the message. 38 
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The reaction to Hertling' s speech itself in the annexationist 
press ranged frorn moderate approval of the Chancellor's failure to 
accept the Wilson program as a basis for negotiations to condemna-
tion for not refusing the program out-of-hand. For exarnple, the 
Hanoversche Kurier saw the speech as a review of "commonplace 
matters" and approved of the Hertling bidfar further proposals from 
the Entente. 39 In contrast, the Leipziger Neuste Nachrichten was 
vociferous in its disapproval of Hertling' s message. 
Hertling's reply to Wilson was entirely 
inappropriate. The only way to surprise a Yankee 
is to shake one 1 s fist at him. A reply of this sort 
would make Wilson sit up and take notice. Hert-
ling should have demanded that Arne rica furnish 
guarantees that the extensive election corruption 
in the United States, which vitiates the democratic 
suffrage, shall be remedied, that social legislation 
and laws for the prevention of accidents be intro-
duced, that America participate in colonial readjust-
ment on condition that the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, 
Haiti, Puerto Rico, and St. Thomas are evacuated, 
and that American troops are withdrawn from the 
Panama Canal. It must be made plain to America 
that if the Monroe Doctrine is to be respected, she 
must reciprocally abstain from all interference in 
38Taegliche Rundschau, January 25, 1918. 
39Hanoversche Kurier, January 25, 1918. 
European affairs; this is the only wad to talk to 
America if we want understanding. 4 
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Thus again we see the German pique at being preached at by the leader 
of a nation which many Germans considered as unfit to assume the role 
of world saviour. 
From the press and parliamentary comment in the month of 
January touching the Fourteen Points, we can see that the speech had 
at least gained one of its major objectives. It had heaped more fuel 
on the conflagration inside Germany. The split between the Socialists 
and Liberals and their government was widened. The Fourteen Points 
had given to these groups a way out, a means to end the slaughter and 
build a rational world order. When their government did not take 
advantage of this, it made it difficult for these groups to support it. 
The Danish newspaper, the Tydbatt, reported on January 23 that the 
Fourteen Points were considered in many German circles as a suitable 
basis for the regulation of society in the future. The same paper also 
reported that, together with the events at Brest, the January 8 speech 
41 
had prepared the ground for Bolshevik tendencies. Mr. Carl Acker-
man, Colonel House's representative in Switzerland, observed that 
the Fourteen Points Spee ch had had the 1nost important effect of any 
public address since the United States had entered the war. These 
40Leipziger Neuste Nachrichten, January 26, 19 18 . 
41Great Britain, War Office, Daily Review of the Foreign 
Press, January, 1919, p. 683. 
were the reasons he gave for his opinion: 
It separated absolutely, and I think permanently, 
the people and the Liberals from the Annexationists, 
the Military Leaders and the War Industrial magnates; 
it forced the Austro-Hungarian Government to recognize 
the peace movement in that country and cemented the 
Dual Monarchy to the German Liberal party; it gave 
more momentum to the revolutionary movement, which 
is under way in Germany, than the Russian revolution; 
it increased the possibilities of success for the present 
confidential negotiations which are taking place with 
Bulgaria; and it made a tremendous impression upon 
the small European neutrals ... The war has reached 
the decisive period. 4 2 
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Ackern,.an I s appraisal of the situation was correct. The scene was 
set for great developments. Wilson, and to an extent, Lloyd George, 
had offered the first inclusive program for world peace. The Chan-
cellor of the main Central Power nation had commented at length on 
the program and had even asked for a clarification. The Foreign 
l\!Iinister of the second Central Pow~r nation had asked publicly for 
a rapproachment. Also, large segments of the German and Austrian 
populations we re ready to talk peace. It was now Wilson's turn to 
answer, which he did before a joint session of Congress on 
February 11, 1918. 
42seymour, Intimate Papers, Vol. III, pp. 3 55 -357. 
CHAPTER III 
THE LOST CHANCE 
February and March 1918 
But before Wilson could answer, another reply was given 
the Central Powers, one which was not designed to lessen Germany's 
resistance. On February 4, after reviewing the German and 
Austrian speeches, the Allied Supreme War Council at Versailles 
issued a declaration in answer to Bertling and Czernin. The essence 
of the answer is contained in the following paragraph: 
The Supreme War Council gave the m.ost 
careful consideration to the recent utterances of 
the German Chancellor and the Austro -Hungarian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, but was unable to 
find in them any real approximation to the moder -
ate conditions laid down by the Allied Governments. 
This conviction was only deepened by the impression 
made by the contrast between the professed idealis -
tic aims with which the Central Powers entered 
upon the present negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and 
their now openly disclosed plans of conquest and 
spoilation. Under the circumstances, the Supreme 
War Council decided that the only immediate task 
before them lay in the prosecution with the utmost 
vigour, and in the closest and most effective co-
operation, of the military efforts of the Allies, until 
such time as the pressure of that effort shall have 
brought about in the enemy Governments and peoples 
a change in temper which would justify the hope of 
the conclusion of peace on terms which would not 
involve the abandonment, in face of an aggressive 
and unrepentant militarism, of all the principles of 
freedom, justice and the respect for the Law of 
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Nations which the Allies are resolved to vindicate. 1 
President Wilson, in his Four Principles Speech of Febru-
ary 11, 1918, found Hertling's speech vague, confusing, full of 
equivocal phrases, and leading to no clearly defined goal. "His 
discussion, 11 said the President, "and acceptance of our general 
principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply 
them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any 
final settlement. 112 Wilson, after reviewing the points wherein the 
Chancellor had failed, reiterated the purpose of America's partici-
pation in the war. 
The United States has no desire to inter -
£ere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in 
European territorial disputes ... But she entered 
this war because she was made a partner, whether 
she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities 
inflicted by the military masters of Germany 
against the peace and security of mankind and the 
conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as 
they will touch any other nation to which is en-
trusted a leading part in the maintenance of civili-
zation. 3 
In contrast to his reply to Hertling, Wilson said that, "Count Czernin 
seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and 
4 
does not seek to obscure t hem. 11 The high water mark of his 
1
Lloyd George, op. cit., p. 47. 
2 J. B. McMasters, The United States in the World War (New 
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1929), Vol. l,pp--:--450-51. -
3Ibid., pp. 452. 
41bid. , p. 453. 
speech was his clarification of the Fourteen Points. He said: 
After all, the test of whether it is possible 
for either Government to go any further in this com-
parison of views is simple and obvious. The 
principles to be applied are these: , 
First, that each part of the final settlement 1nust 
be based upon the essential just ice of that particu-
lar case and upon such adjustments as are most 
likely permanent. 
Second, That peoples and provinces are not to be 
bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty 
as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, 
even the great game, now forever discredited, of 
the balance of power. But that--
Third, Every territorial settlement involved in 
this war must be made in the interest and for the 
benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a 
part of any n1ere adjustn1ent or compromise of 
claims among rival States; and, 
Fourth, That all well-defined national aspirations 
shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can 
be accorded them without introducing new or per-
petuating odd elements of discord and antag onism 
that would be likely in time to break the peace of 
Europe, and consequently the world. A general 
peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. 
Until such a ~eace can be secured we have no choice 
but to go on. 
The press response in Germany to the Four Principles 
Speech was again varied. 
It must be determined ... whether P resident 
Wilson I s remark as to there being no obstacle to an 
immediate discussion of peace is only a diplomatic 
move or really a redeeming word for mankind, 
~ Ibid. , pp. 453 -454. 
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commented the Vorwaerts. 11 German answer ought and must be no 
other than that we are also ready for peace discussions forthwith. 11 6 
The liberal Berliner Tageblatt stressed the apparent contradiction 
between Wilson's conciliatory speech and the Versailles declaration. 
"Mr. Wilson's new speech, 11 observed that paper, " shows an inclina-
tion to continue the peace discussion, but that can onl y be of practical 
value when the policy of the Entente as a whole decides in favor of a 
general peace. 117 The semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung brought up the same c onsideration. 
Mr. Wilson must fir st win over his own 
Allies for his principles of which hitherto they 
woul d not hear. It woul d be a goo d thing if Mr. 
Wilson, who c l a ims that he does not desire to 
interfere in European affairs or act as world 
arbitrator in European territorial disputes, re -
turned in course of time to the Monroe Doctrine 
which was formerly regarded by the United 
States as sacred. 8 
The annexationist Taegliche Rundschau saw Wilson's words as a 
trap. 
President Wilson has this time used more 
civilized l anguage than usual, but neither his old 
tactics of arousing hatred against Germany's aris -
tocracy, nor his attemp ts to sow dissension be-
tween the Central Powers have been abandoned, nor 
has he lost sight of his main aim, which is the 
establishment of an Anglo - American world dominion 
6 vorwaerts, February 13, 1918. 
7Berliner Tageblatt, February 13, 1918. 
8
Norddeutsche Allgemeine, Feb ruary 13, 1918. 
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under the trading name of the community of nations. 9 
The immediate raison d'etre of the Fourteen Points was, as 
has been said before, the Russian situation. It was in February that 
events in the east took a turn which detrimentally affected the inter -
national exchange of views in the west. The negotiations at Brest 
had been proceeding during January and liad finally come to the point 
where, on January 28, the Bolshevik delegates, lead by Trotsky, 
returned home to lay the German terms before the Soviet. On Janu-
ary 30, they returned to Brest. On February 10, they broke off 
negotiations by refusing to sign the treaty and formally withdrawing 
Russia from the war. This was the policy of 11no peace, no war 11 • 
Trotsky boldly announced to the world: 
The peace negotiations are at an end ... 
Russia, for its part, declares the present war with 
Germany and Austro-Hungary, Turkey, and Bul-
garia at an end. 10 
This seemingly suicidal policy was undertaken to influence and 
precipitate the world revolution. On February 18, after giving the 
Russians seven days to return and resume negotiations, the German 
forces began their advance. It was impossible for the Russians to 
resist, so the next day, February 19, Lenin and Trotsky issued a 
wireless proclamation denouncing the invasion but declaring their 
willingness to sign a peace on the terms dictated by the Central Powers 
9 Tageliche Rundschau, February 13, 1918. 
10 
McMasters, op. cit., p. 455. 
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On February 23, the Imperial Government, through Kuehlmann, n'lade 
a new peace offer, the terms of which were more severe than the 
previous ones. These terms were accepted and a new delegation went 
to Brest. On March 3, the treaty was signed and the Gierman advance 
was stopped. By the terms of this treaty, Finland, Estonia, Livonia, 
Courland, Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine, and Russian Armenia were 
separated from Russia. The peace of no-annexation was dead. 
Chancellor Hertling replied to Wilson in a speech on Febru-
ary 28. In this address he touched on the situation in the east, for it 
certainly needed explanation if it was not to affect adversely a 
rapproachment between the belligerents in the west. But before doing 
so, he turned to the Four Principles. He accepted Principle One 
saying, "Who would contradict this?" Principles Two and Three also 
could "be unconditionally assented to. 11 Then he went on: 
Now in the fourth clause he demands th.at all 
well-defined national aspirations should be accorded 
the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them ... 
Here also I give assent in principle, and I declare 
therefore, with President Wilson, that a general 
peace on such a basis is discussable. 
But Hertling made the provision that these principles "must be definitely 
recognized by all States and nations" and not only America and Germany. 11 
The Chancellor then proceeded to explain the German 
position regarding Russia: 
Our war aiins from the beginning were the 
11 Ibid., p. 454. 
defense bf the Fatherland, maintenance of our 
territorial integrity, and the freedom of our economic 
development. Our warfare, even when it must be 
aggressive in action, is defensive in aim. I lay 
special stress on that subject just now in order that 
no misunderstanding shall arise about our operations 
in the e~st. After breaking off the peace negotiations 
by the Russian delegation on February tenth we had a 
free hand against Russia. The sole aim of the ad-
vance of our troops, which was begun seven days 
after the rupture, was to safeguard the fruits of our 
peace with the Ukraine. Aiins of conquest were in 
no way a determining factor .... We do not intend to 
establish our selves for example, in Esthonia, or 
Livonia. In eourland and Lithuania our chief object 
is to create organs of self-determination and self-
administration. 12 
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This apologia ,was, of course, necessary. However, it did not hold 
water as far as the Allies were concerned. German actions had 
spoken louder than German words. To Wilson, it was now absolutely 
clear that the military controlled Germany. The question put forth 
in the Fourteen Points Speech had been answered. 
But in pursuance of the opportunity offered by the inter-
national dialog, the German Government acted to start discussions. 
On the basis of both the Fourteen Points and the Four Principles, the 
German Foreign Ministry sent two unofficial agents to Switzerland to 
speak to Dr. George D. Herron who was an unofficial American 
representative there. The Germans were Conrad Haussmann and 
Professor Ludwig Quidde, the former an advisor to Hertling and the 
latter a pacifist. They stated to Herron Germany's desire for peace 
12Ibid. , p. 455. 
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and her willingness to make it on the basis of the principles of 
February 11. When the more specific Fourteen P oints were re-
viewed, however, they hedged on Point Eight, the Alsace-Lorraine 
question. These talks came to naught, partly because the American 
representative did not believe in the Germans I sincerity. 13 
Paralleling the move of the German Foreign Ministry to 
open discussions on the basis of the Fourteen Points, Czernin made 
attempts of his own. During the first week of August, Dr. Heinrich 
Lammasch, an Austria! Liberal, was sent to Switzerland where he 
had several long conversations with Dr. Herron. He expressed to t l1 e 
American his Emperor's wish for peace and determination to reform 
the AU:stro-Hungarian Empire. Dr. Herron found the Emperor's 
plan insufficient and urged Lammasch to persuade the Emperor to 
extend his contemplated reforms. 14 On February 19, Czernin in-
creased his efforts by sending to Wilson, t hrough the King of Spain, 
an offer of peace based on the President's speech of February 11. 
There was no mention, however, of the Fourteen Points. 15 In con-
junction with these approaches to the Americans, conversations were 
13M. P. Briggs , George D. Herron and the European 
Settlement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932), pp. 44-52; 
E. Dahlin, French and German Public Opinion on Declared War Aims 
1914-1918 (Stanford: Stanford University Press-; 1933), pp. 131-132. 
14 Seymour, Intirn.ate Papers, Vol. III, p. 372. 
15
Ibid., p. 373. 
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started with the British. General Jan Smuts, the South African 
statesman, and Count Mensdorff, the Austrian diplomat, attempted 
to find some basis of negotiations. 16 All these attempts were 
unavailing. Czernin explained their failure as follows: 
So long as Italy wishes to annex Austrian 
territory and France declares that she will not 
make peace without acquiring Alsace -Lorraine, 
peace with these powers is impossible. If, how-
ever, they abandon their aims of conquest, the 
Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs sees no 
obstacle to the conclusion of peace at once. 17 
Wilson was shocked by the enforced peace of Brest-Litovsk. 
This shock is amply shown by his message of sympathy to the Pan-
Soviet Congress which had assembled in Moscow to ratify the peace: 
May I not take advantage of the m.eeting of 
the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere 
sympathy which the people of the United States feel 
for the Russian people at this moment when the 
German power has been thrust in to interrupt and 
turn back the whole struggles for freedom and 
substitute the wishes of Germany for the purpose 
of the people of Russia? 18 
As far as Wilson was concerned, Brest-Litovsk was the answer to 
his peace proposals. One year after .Alnerica's entry into the war, 
on April 6, 191 8, the President in a speech at Baltimore took up the 
gauntlet which he considered had been thrown down by German actions 
l6Lloyd George, op. cit., pp. 21-35, 48-54. 
17seymour, Intimate Papers, Vol. III, pp. 379-381. 
18Ibid., p. 420. 
in Russia. He declared: 
I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to 
discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time 
that is sincerely purp osed . ... But the answer ... 
came from the German commanders in Russia, and 
I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer. 19 
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In concl usion, he set down the future course of the United States as 
follows : 
Germany has once more said that force and 
force a lone, shall decide whether justice and peace 
shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as 
America conceives it or domini on as she conceives 
it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There 
is, therefore , but one response possible for us: 
Force, force to the utmost , force without stint or 
limit, the r i ghteous and triump hant force which 
shall make right the law of the world and cast every 
sel fish dominion down in the dust. 20 
The President's interpretation of the German acti ons in the 
east made the Fourteen Points a dead issue for the time being. They 
had been designed for numerous purposes. Firstly, to save the 
Russians and the Allies from the consequences of a German victory 
in the east. This they failed to do. Germany has her eastern peace 
and a free hand in the west. Secondly, the Fourteen Points were aimed 
at increasing the political warfare within Germany. This they did most 
effe cti vel y. Thirdly, they were intended to placate the liberal and 
labor forces within the Allies. This they did. However, their long 
19Baker and Dodd, op. cit., p. 202. 
20Ibid. 
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range and basic purpose, anyway as far as Wilson was cone erned, 
of se r ving as a b lueprint for a general peace and a rational wo r l d 
order, was not accomplished. Much had to pass and many had to die 
before U1ey cam.e to the fore again. 
CHAPTER IV 
GERMANY LOSE S THE WAR 
W hen Germany went to war in 19 14, the plan was to gain a 
qui ck victory in the west while h olding in the east. But when German 
plans were upset by the m.iscalculations of the military and French 
resistance, trench warfare of position instead of movement set in. 
A new strategy was, therefore, forced upon the Germans: a decision 
in the west had to wait while German effo rts were concentrated on 
the eastern front. With the overthrow of the Tsarist regime in 
March, 1917, it became manifest that the German policy had borne 
fruit. The Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave the German military 
the chance it had wanted all through the war, a free hand to concen-
trate on the western front . They were disentangl ed in the east, and 
a l though they felt it necessary to keep about a million men there on 
occupation duty, f o rty new divisions were availabl e for operations in 
France. For the first time in years the Germans boasted of a 
nun1erical superiority in the west, and this superiority of about 200, 000 
men gave General L udendo r ff great hope of being able to crush the 
A liies before American help becam.e effective. 
The German offensive operations began with an artillery bom-
bardment on March 2 1 , 19 18, in the Arras sector in Picardy. The 
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Kaiserschlacht was on. The initial German efforts were rewarded 
with considerable success. Within Germany there was an increase 
of annexationist prestige and activity. The Pan-German League, at 
a meeting on April 14, adopted a resolution which stated: 
The Ger1nan people must demand from the 
sense of duty of the Reichstag that it give up the 
decision of July 19, 1917, and following this his -
torical events, stand for the war aim which arises 
out of the military situation. 1 
On August 9, General August Keim, a Pan-German l eader, addressing 
the Army League, demanded the annexation of Belgium.2 Ten days 
later the Vaterlandspartei held a general meeting which resulted in 
3 
a manifesto similar to that of the Pan-Germans. In this same month, 
the Vossische Zeitung circulated a questionnaire among the leaders 
of German industry, asking their aims regarding France. lVIen such 
as Ernest von Borsig, August Thyssen, and Albert Voegler declared 
in reply that the iron districts of Briey and Longwy in France should 
be annexed by Germany as they were of vital importance to Germany's 
economic development. 4 Also, at this time, Jacob Reichart, the 
secretary of the Union of German Iron and Steel Industrialists 
1vossische Zeitung, April 15, 1918. 
2Kreuz Zeitung, April 10, 1918. 
3 Great Britain, War Office, Enemy Press Supplement, III, 
May 2, 1918, p. 1081. 
4v ossische Zeitung, April 7, 1918. 
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(Verein Deutscher Eisen-und Stahlindustrieller) wrote two pamphl:ets 
pointing out the necessity of annexing French iron ore regions. 5 In 
general, the German industrialists welcomed the German victories 
as promising a great future for them. 
Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff shared the optimism of the 
Pan-Germans and industrialists. Hindenburg wrote to Alfred Hugen-
berg on March 31, 1918, that "the events of the past months prove 
that the kind of victory we need for Germany 1s political and economic 
future can no longer be wrested from us. 11 6 On April 16, he joined 
the Pan-Germans in urging the Reichstag to declare itself ''for a 
strong German peace, which alone can preserve us from a future war. 11 7 
Not all the support for westward annexation during this period came 
from the military and the industrialists. The leader of the Christian 
labor unions, Adam Stegerwald, said in April that "if we are able to 
conclude a powerful peace, we want such a peace under all circum-
stances. 11 Also, the organ of the Christian metal and foundry workers 1 
union, the Deutsche Metallarbeiter, on April 6, 1918, demanded the 
5 J. Reichert, Aus Deutschlands Waffenschmiede (Berlin, 
1918), pp. 107-109; J. Reichert, Was sind uns die Erzbecken von 
Briey und Longwy? (Berlin, 191 8 ), passim. -- -- --
60. Kriegk, Hugenburg (Leipzig: 1932), p. 40. 
7R-eichstag, Vol. 311, p. 4574. 
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annexation of Briey and Longwy. 8 
It was difficult, in light of military successes and internal 
agitation, for the Reichstag Majority to withstand the many requests 
for repudiation of the July 19 Peace Resolution. As usual, it was 
only the Socialists who maintained their support of the declaration 
intact. In the Center and Progressive Parties, there was a deser-
tion of the Peace Resolution. Speakers of both these parties clairned 
that Germany now had a free hand in making a peace as the Allies 
had refused to accept Germany's peace offers. Reichstag deputy, 
Karl Trimborn of the Center Party, at a meeting of that party in the 
Rhineland, declared in April that his party would approve any peace 
settlement in the west as it had done in the east. 9 On the other hand, 
Erzberger in May published a declaration of adherence to the Reso-
lution. IO Among the Progressives, deputy Otto Fischbeck in April 
published an article advocating that the party disassociate itself from 
the Peace Resolution. This article was supported by his colleagues, 
Ernst Mueller -Meiningen and Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz. 
8 Germany, Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruches 
in Jahr 1918 (Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschusses der Deutschen 
Verfassunggebenden Nationalalversammlung und des Deutschen 
Reich.stages, 1919-1929. Vierte Reihe. 12 Vol., Berlin, 1925-1930), 
Vol. VII, p. 34, 
9Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, April 7, 1918. 
lOGermania, May 3, 1918. 
However, the majority of the party under Friedrich Naumann 
declared i ts adherence to the July 19 Resolution. 11 The Brest-
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Litovsk Treaty and the initial successes in tl1.e west had effectively 
vitiated the strength of the Resolution. Only the Left, as a group, 
held fast in support of it. Gustav Stresmann came very near to the 
truth when he said on March 10, 1918, to a meeting of the National 
Liberal Par.ty: "Practically we have brought it to this, that a con-
clusion of peace, in opposition to the policy of July 19, has been 
agreed to by all the bourgeois parties. 1112 
The optimism felt by the military-annexationists was to be 
short lived. The first attacks had been successful, but by the end 
of March, after about one week, the German attacks had spent their 
force. The plan had been to exploit a gap between the French and 
the British armies and to decisively defeat the JBri.tish. This was not 
accomplished and by April 5, 1918, the first German offensive had 
come to a halt. The net effect was about a quarter of a million casual-
ties on both sides, causing a deficit which the Germans, unlike the 
Allies, could not make up. But Ludendorff was not to be put off. He 
opened another offensive on April 9 to the north in the Armentieres 
sector. This, like the previous one, brought initial success to the 
11c. Haussmann, Schlaglichter (Frankfurt a. M.: Frank -
furt Societaets -Druckerei, 1924), 1. 187. 
12Berliner Tageblatt, March 11, 1918. 
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German arms. The high point was reached by the taking of the pivot 
of Mount Kernel on April 25. Despite this, there was no break-
through and Ludendorff called the offensive off on April 30. The total 
casualties of both offensives on both sides were about equal, 331,797 
for the Allies and 348,300 for the Germans, but, as said before, the 
manpower deficit worked to the disadvantage of the Germans. 
The effect of the two offensives was such as to require a 
rnonth of recuperation before new major operations could be launched. 
During this period of waiting, doub ts as to the outcome of the military 
actions in the west appeared among the German people. In May, 
Conrad Haussmann wrote to Colonel von Haeften, the Army represen-
tative in the Foreign Ministry, as follows: 
The public doesn't read the Army communi-
ques anymore. It is uncertain about the offensive, 
whether it is still going on or whether it is to start 
all over again. Public opinion in the villages and 
cities is very quiet. 13 
By May 27 Ludendorff was ready again, and on that morning , 
an artillery barrage opened the new offensive. As before, the Germans 
had great initial successes. They easily took the ridge of the Chemin 
des Dames and by June 3, they had reached the Marne east of 
Chateaux-Thierry, an advance of thirty miles. The success had been 
so unexpected that the offensive had to be stopped on June 6 because 
of supply difficulties. A second offensive was launched on June 9. 
131-Iaussmann, op. cit., p . 197. 
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Strong French opposition and c ounter-attacks broke the German offen-
sive and it was called off on the 13th. As a result of the two offensives, 
the French and British, and also some Americans who first saw action 
in May, suffered 162,803 casualt i es as against 1·69, 481 for the Germans. 
It was in June that the rate of American reinfo rcement had reached 
250, 000 a month. 
Du ring the rest of June and until the middl e of July, the 
western front saw only m i n o r though bloody actions, among which was 
the capture of the Belleau Woods by the American Second Division. 
The last of the great German offensives, the drive to .ward Paris, came 
in the latter part of July. 
Despite the initial successes of the Spring offensives, it soon 
becam:e clear to the German military leaders that peace in the west 
could not come by military measures alone. As early as April, 
L udendorff had rec ognized that "the enemy's res i stance was beyond 
our strength" . 14 On June l, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, the 
German c ommander in Bel gium, had written to Hertling informing him 
of the impo ssibility of a German victory as American aid was giving 
the Entente a manpower advantage. The Crown Prince broached the 
idea of a political offensive to suppl ement the military. He suggested 
"that the only way to bring peace is to declare \Our desire to 1naintain 
14E. L udendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen (Berlin: E. S. 
Mittler und Sohn, 1929 ) , p. 485. 
the independence of Belgium inviolate. 1115 In his reply of June 5, 
Bertling expressed agreement with the ideas of the Crown P rine e 
but postponed action until 
a succession of blows destroying the military might 
of France and England would finally result in a 
powerful movement directed against those govern-
ments, a movement that ... would lead to the opening 
of peace negotiations. 16 
Among the civilians, a desire for a peace offensive was 
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growing. In early May, Hermann Stegemann, an astute observer of 
military and political matters, observed that Germany's position was 
"excellent but hopeless because she had not made a special declara-
tion on Belgium before the military offensive began". He considered 
that such a declaration "would either have made the offensive super-
fluous or else would have increased its effectiveness one hundred-fold. 111 7 
The press took up the question of a political offensive. On May 22, 
the Neue Preussishe Zeitung advocated the idea. A few days later, 
Vorwaerts (June 3) and the Koelnische Zeitung (June 3) followed suit. 
The annexationist press sharply opposed such proposals with the re-
markable exception of the Kreutz Zeitung which printed a series of 
editorials in favor of a negotiated peace. 18 
15ursachen, Vol. II, pp. 191-192. 
16Tuid., pp. 192-193. 
1 7 Max of Baden, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 303 -304. 
18Kreutz Zeitung , June 5, 1918. 
Colonel Haeften also realized that the time had come for 
diplomatic moves as well as military ones. On June 3, he drafted 
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a plan for a peace offensive which was to precede the new military 
offensive and form an adjunct to it. Germany was not to ask for peace 
outright, but there was to be well concealed Government sponsorship 
of public manifestations of the desire for peace. l9 He obtained 
Ludendorff 1 s approval of the plan and tried to get the approval of the 
civilian authorities. 
20 
In his discussions with Hertling, Kuehlmann, 
and Frierich von Payer (the Vice Chancellor), he ran into difficulty 
over the Belgian situation. 21 The plan was ahnost impossible to 
put into effect as long as the Imperial Government and the Army Com-
mand could not agree on this question. Although it was not carried 
out, the plan had so impressed Kuehlm ann that ';he independently 
took a step to precipitate a peace offensive. On June 25, before the 
Reichstag, he declared that 11without some exchange of views ... an 
absolute end can hardly be expected from military decisions alone, 
without recourse to diplomatic negotiations. 11 22 
This pessimistic admission of the failure of the military 
measures brought immediate reaction from the Right and the military. 
19 Ursachen, Vol. II, p. 342. 
20
Ibid., pp. 195-196. 
21Ibid. , p. 19 7. 
22Reichstag , Vol. 312, pp . 5 6 11-12. 
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Count Kuno Westarp in the Reichstag attacked the speech as a threat 
to Germany's morale at home and on the front. 23 The Army Command 
felt that the effects of the Foreign Minister's speech were dangerous, 
and to counteract them, it gave out that it had been painfully surprised 
by it. Haeften ' s plan was now completely disregarded. Both Bertling 
and Kuehlmann tried to quiet the furor by expl anations before the 
Reichstag. However, no action on the Government's part could now 
save Kueh lmann. The Army Command had decided that his dismissal 
was of paramount importance. Hindenburg told Bertling that he could 
no longer work with the Foreign Minister while Ludendorff held the 
same views. "In view of the serious danger to the nation's morale 
through Kuehlmann 1 s speech," wrote the First Quartermaster General 
later, "speedy action was required if the press was to be reassured at 
once and kept from coming to false conclusions about our military situa-
tion. 1124 Therefore, on July ~. Kuehlmann was dismissed. This was 
a major victory for the annexationists and the military. The military 
duomvirate of Hindenburg and Ludendorff had again demonstrated that 
they were the real rulers of Germany, as they had done the previous 
July ( 1917) when they had forced the dismissal of Bet hmann-Bollwe g 
as Imperial Chancellor. 
23Ibid., pp. 5634 -5635. 
24E. Ludendorff, Urkunden der Obersteheeresleitung ueber 
ihre Taetigkeit, 191 6- 191 8 (Berlin: ~S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920), 
pp. 491-492. 
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On July 9, Admiral Paul von Hintze, who was then Minister 
to Norway, was na1ned to the Foreign Ministry. The new Foreign 
Minister, before he assumed office, "put to General Ludendorff the 
formal and carefully framed question whether he was certain of final 
and definite victory over the ·enemy .. . The General replied, 'That I 
can answer with a decided yes! 11125 
After the June offensive, the French Intelligence had come 
to the conclusion that the Germans coul d not attack in force again 
until July 15 at the earliest, and that the attack would a gain come 
11 •.• in the direction of Paris by the valleys of the Oise and the Marne. 11 
This was an almost perfect evaluation, as on July 15 the Germans 
launched an offensive on the Rheims-Soissons front. The Germans 
had managed to acquire a considerable local superiority in both 
infantry and artillery, but as the French, who were aided by nine 
American divisions, were ready, the shock of the German attack was 
absorbed. On July 16, it had been stopped. On July 18, Foch launched 
a carefully prepared counter -attack, m a k ing effective use of tanks. By 
the 6th, day of August, the second battle of the Marne had ended in a 
German defeat. Germany had lost all chance of military victory. The 
race to beat the effect of American reinforcement was lost. Ludendorff 
said: 
The attempt by a German victory to make 
25Germany, Amtliche Urkunden zur Vorgeschichte des 
Waffenstillstandes, 1918 (Berlin: 1924), Document 2. 
the people of the Entente desirous of peace before 
the arrival of American reinforcements was 
wrecked. The Army's striking power was not 
adequate to give the enemy a decisive blow ...• 
I was now quite aware that theriby our whole 
situation had become serious. 2 
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However, Ludendorff still had hope that the German forces could with-
stand the Allied aitacks. "Five times thus far during the war I had to 
withdraw my troops, and still was able in the end to beat the enemy . . 
Why shouldn't I succeed a sixth time? 11 27 
While the military situation in the west was deteriorating 
during July and August, the German home front was suffering the 
ravages of disease and famine. The desire for peace on the part of 
the populace was increasing rapidly . Early in July the Spanish 
Influenza was spreading among the troops and the civilian population. 
The epidemic struck 80, 000 children in Berlin alone. The potato 
ration was cut in July. In Vienna the food shortage was so great that 
appeals for help were sent to Germany. Military traffic on the rail-
roads prevented the importation of food from the Ukraine and Rumania. 
On July 6, the bread ration was cut although it had just been reduced 
in June. People were warned that meatless weeks were soon to be 
introduced. 
26ursachen, II, 8 0; Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, 
pp. 534-540. 
27 G. F. Hertling, Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei (Freiburg 
im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1919), p. 146; Ursachen, 
II, 222. 
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Beside food shortages, other commodities were becoming 
scarce. Coal went u~ in price by three marks a ton in July. Metal 
shortages led to the melting down of public monuments in Berlin and 
the confiscation of metal from private homes. In July the shortage 
of clothing caused the confiscation of table linens from hotels and 
restaurants to make underwear for the needy. Discarded clothing 
had to be handed over to the Government under threat of a year I s im-
prisonment or a thousand marks I fine. 
Needless to say, the above mentioned conditions resulte d in 
a lessening of morale among the German people. Beside grumbling, 
more overt action was taken by many. Strikes increased in number, 
and in at least one case troops were used against strikers. 28 As 
Germany entered the fifth year of war in August 1918, it became 
increasingly evident that both the home front and the military one 
were cracking. On August 10, the Vorwaerts pointed out the true 
situation: 
The people now are apprised of the fact 
that it is impossible to succeed in a war of many 
years I duration against a coalition of the entire 
world. It is now time to abolish the military dicta-
torship in Germany and to let the entire world see 
Germany's better side so that the war can be brought 
to a happy end. 
If it took the above mentioned accumulation of miseries to 
28H. R. Rudin, Armistice 1918 {New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1944), pp. 13-14. 
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make the Gern~an people realize that the war could not end in a Ger-
man victory, it took a sharp blow on the head to get the idea across 
to Ludendorff, Germany's real master, On August 8, the French 
and British attacked in the Amiens sector, the British using over 400 
tanks. The magnitude of the battled and the extent of the German 
defeat can be seen in the fact that the Germans lost 28, 000 men in 
one day, 15,000 of them captured, while the British lost 9,000 men 
and about two-thirds of their tanks. The Germans fell back and only 
stopped retreating only when they reached the old trenches on the 
Somme four days later. In the ten days between August 6 to 15, the 
Allies lost 46, 000 men while the Germans lost 75, 000, about 20, 000 
of them prisoners. The disproportionate number of prisoners was 
indicative of the state of morale among the German troops. Retiring 
German troops, upon meeting fresh troops going to the front, called 
them strike-breakers. Ludendorff was shocked by the events of 
August 8 and called it "the black day of the German Army in the history 
of this war 11 • 29 
In the face of the military debacle developing in France, the 
German press closed ranks. Both the Left and the Right called on 
the people to unite in face of danger. The Vorwaerts of August 11 
warned of defeatism, while the socialist Internationale Korrespondenz 
commentedr "Regarding one thing, it must be quite clear. That is, 
29Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen, pp. 547-550. 
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that the way to peace is ..• by the attainment of a German victory. 11 30 
Similarly, the Rheinische Westfa:elische Zeitung, an annexationist 
organ, said: 11 Hindenburg and Ludendorff have proved scores of 
times that they are army leaders of great resources. But one point 
we must keep clearly in mind: that the road to peace can only lead 
through German victory. 11 31 
In. view of the military situation, a conference of the 
civilian and military leaders of Germany was immediately called. 
On August 13, von Hintze met with Ludendorff at Spa and received 
assurances of Germany's ability to fight a defensive war, Although 
the Quartermaster General now admitted that he was uncertain of 
obtaining a peace through offensive action, he fully expected to b ring 
the Allies to terms by a strategic defense on French soil. At the 
Crown Council meeting the next day, the internal, external, and 
military situations were reviewed. As a result of their deliverations, 
it was decided to make an attempt to get a peace . 11 We must be on the 
watch, 11 said the Kaiser, 11 for the opportune moment at which to arrive 
at an understanding with the enemy." It was decided to wait until 
"the next success on the western front" to inaugurate the peace moves 
which von Hintze was now advocating. 32 
30rntenationale Korrespondenz, August 11, 1918. 
31Rheinische Westfaelische Zeitung , August 13, 191 8 . 
32A:mtliche Urkunden, Document l; Ursachen, II, 227-234. 
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On the third day of the meetings, August 15, Kaiser Karl 
of Austria and his Foreign Minister, Count Stephan Burian, who had 
replaced Czernin, joined the discussions. Their purpose was to get 
German cooperation on a direct appeal for peace. The Germans 
prevailed upon them to wait. 
In the German press, there was a misreading of the purpose 
of the conference. It was considered as called to discuss only routine 
matters. The Hamburger Fremdenblatt commented: 11 Germany and 
Austria -Hungary wish to bring this jointly conducted war of defense to 
a successful conclusion. Therefore, the meeting of monarchs is no 
sensational event, but the natural result of the alliance. 1133 Germania 
similarly observed: 11 The meeting of the two Emperors was arranged •.. 
for the purpose of discussing .•. a closer alliance between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary. 113 4 
After the Crown Council deliberations, von Hintze began to 
prepare the ground for peace moves. He was handicapped by the 
same factor which had prevented Haeften 1s plan from being carried 
out; the inability of getting the supreme command to agree to a state -
ment on Belgium which would be acceptable to the Allies. On August 
19, von Hintze tried unsuccessfully to get a concession on the matter 
33 Hamburger Fremdenblatt, August 15, 1918. 
34G . erman1a, August 18, 1918. 
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from Ludendo rff. 35 On August 24, Bertling and von Payer drafted 
a statement which L udendorff and Hindenburg approved. This 
declaration 1nade the restoration of Belgium dependent on the return 
of Germany's c olon i es. Even this qualified declaration was not to 
be made public formally; it had to be concealed in a speech made by 
von Payer in mid - Sep tember. 3 6 
Meanwhile, the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
could wait no l onger in their search for peace. Despite their promise 
to the Germans, Count Burian contacted the Bulgarian and Turkish 
governments and got their support for a direct appeal. The Germans 
then tried to get the Austr ians to refrain from such an appeal, but 
on September 14, B u r i an issued a note asking for a general peace 
conference. It was called for the belligerents to open immediately 
"confidential, non-bi nding conversations over the fundamental principles 
of a peace treaty". 371 Wilson cut the move short by replying : 
The Government of the United States ... 
has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the 
terms upon which the United States woul d con-
sider peace and can and will entertain no proposal 
for a conference upon a matter concerning which 
35 
Ursachen, Vol. II, pp. 236-238, 382-383. 
36Ibid . 
37united States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1918 , Suppl ement 1 (Washington, D. C.: 
Government P rinti ng Office, 1928 ) , Vol:-r, pp. 309-3 10. 
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it has made its position and purpose so plain. 38 
For the most part, the German press received the Austrian 
note as a good move, although doubt was expressed as to its effective-
ness. The Vorwaerts saw its possible harmful effects. To counter-
act them, it was necessary that "the good effects be developed ' '. That 
paper continued: 
Austria-Hungary's demarche will be welcomed 
by the widest circles of the German people, and many 
hopes will be placed in it. It is necessary here to 
utter a warning against over-hasty optimism. 39 
The National Liberal Boersen Zeitung placed no great hopes in the 
demarche. 40 The liberal Vossische Zeitung saw the note as an im-
perilment of peace possibilities because it created a fissure in the 
solid front against the Entente. 41 The Lokal Anzeiger commented: 
"We cannot, after the experiences we have hitherto had with our 
peace proposals, help feeling thoroughly sceptical. 11 Some of the 
right-wing press expressed anger. 42 The Rheinische Westfaelische 
Zeitung felt that it was unfortunate that, as a newspaper, the organ 
was "not in a position" to express itself on "the action of our ally 
38rbid. 
39vorwaerts, September 16, 1918. 
40Boersen Zeitung, September 16, 1918. 
41
vossische Zeitung, September 16, 1918, 
42Lokal Anzeiger, September 15, 1918. 
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as it deserves. 1143 
Despite the attempts to interpret it favorably, however, the 
Austro-Hungarian note shocked the Germans and helped greatly to 
accelerate the decline of German civilian and military morale. On 
the home front, every third week now was a meatless one and milk 
and butter prices were rising. On September 1 7 , it was reported 
that tobacco supplies would be exhausted by the end of the year. 
Tuberculosis and influenza were spreading and even cholera was 
reported in Berlin. 4 ~ As usual, the opposition to the Government 
was lead by the Social Democrats. This opposition was centered 
around the failure to do away with the three-class franchise system 
in Prussia. Although Hertling and the Kaiser had expressed support 
for such a change, the three -class system became the rallying point 
of the Reichstag Majority. In April the franchise bill had been intro-
duced in the Prussian House of Deputies. On the second reading, it 
was changed so as to rob it of its purpose by replacing its equal 
franchise provisions with a system of plural franchise. The b ill was 
passed in this adulterated form on July 4, but this did not halt a heated 
debate on the subject. In September, the Vorwaerts linked the 
question to the international problem of peace making. It said that 
the question was not only a Prussian and a German one but also an 
43Rheinische Westfaelische Zeitung, September 16, 191 8. 
44Rudin, op. cit., p. 35. 
international one, for there was no other way to rid Germany of 
Prussian militarism which 11must go before all Germany, not only 
Prussia, is ruined by its influence 11 • 45 
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To improve the morale of the people, a series of speeches 
by high official s were made. At Karlsruhe Prince Max of Baden 
called for national unity in the search for peace .. On September 10, 
the Kaiser addressed the Krupp workers at Essen, exhorting them. 
to continue the fight. But the most important speech was that of von 
Payer, made on September 12. In it he denied that Germany wanted 
western annexations and stated specifically that: 11 We can even 
evacuate Belgium just as soon as we get to it. 11 He spoke in favor of 
a League of Nations, the return of Germany's colonies, freedom of 
the seas, disarmament, and stated that, although Germany was the 
aggrieved party, she would not demand indemnities. 46 
Von Payer's speech was greeted with praise by the liberals 
because it was a step toward peace. The Progressive Boersen 
Kurier remarked: "The speech is free from expressions which can 
be given different meanings, so that the enemy will find it necessary 
to reply as openly to the precise delimitation of German war aims. 1147 
A sour note was struck, however, by the Vorwaerts which, under 
45vorwaerts, September 2, 1918. 
46Frankfurter Zeitung, September 13, 1918. 
47 Boersen Kurier, September 13, 1918. 
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the heading "Dangers in the New Program", thought that von Payer's 
speech did not really offer a lasting solution. 11 lt is impossible to 
get rid of the problems raised by the World War by everything in the 
west be coming as before and everything in the east remaining as 
created by the war. 11 48 The annexationist press s h owed hostility 
and considered the speech as a "national scandal" and a "diplomatic 
and political catastrophe". 49 
While the domestic situation was deteriorating rapidly, the 
military situation was growing worse. A new offensive was being 
laun ched by the Allies against a weakened Bulgaria. Late in Septem-
ber, the British on the Saint Quentin front and the French and the 
Americans on the Meuse-Argonne renewed their attack. Bulgaria 
was about to give up, and in the west German troops were surrender-
ing in large numbers. Signs of low morale even appeared among 
the officers. On September 25, Premier Malinow of Bulgaria asked 
the Allies for an armistice. 
On September 24, a session of the Main Committee of the 
Reichstag was called. The Chancellor stated that he approved of 
Wilson's Fourteen Points and the Four Principles. He especially 
advocated disarmament, a League, of Nations, and freedom of the seas. SO 
4 8vorwaerts, September 13, 1918. 
49 Berliner Tageblatt, September 13, 1918. 
5°Frankfurter Zeitung, September 25, 1918. 
Von Hintze stated that Germany was ready for peace but, although 
he accepted it, he disagreed with the timing of Austria's peace 
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move. Scheidemann was most caustic in his criticism of the Gov-
ernment. He attacked the Chancellor as being weak for he had been 
11unable to prevent what we do 11-ot want .... the war must be ended to 
keep us from being smashed". 51 
It was becoming apparent to both the civilian and military 
authorities that conditions were such as to require an end to hostilities 
as rapidly as possible. The idea arose of approaching Wilson in 
peace efforts. Ludendorff suggested to von Hintze that he contact the 
Americans for negotiations. On September 23, three Foreign 
Ministry experts submitted to von Hintze a memorandum which stated 
that the "most important prerequisite for the coming peace is the 
formation ... of a new Government on a broad national base". The 
memorandum continued: 
The new Government formed in this way s h ould 
approach President Wilson at the opportune moment 
with a request to undertake the restoration of peace 
and for this purpose to all belligerents that plenipoten-
tiaries be sent to Washington. If it be the wish of our 
military authorities, it should be suggested to the 
President that he invite the belligerents, possibly at 
the same time, to conclude an armistice. Our request 
to Mr. Wilson should be accompanied by the declara-
tion that Germany, and possibly the Quadruple Alliance 
also, is ready to base. peace negotiations nn the Presi-
dents familiar Fourteen Points. 5Z 
51
Ibid. 
52 Ursachen, II, 251; Amtliche Urkunden, Document 12. 
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While the Foreign Ministry was planning a reorganization of 
the Government, public criticism of the Government in general and 
the Chancellor in particular was growing . The Vossische Zeitung on 
September 23 suggested that the Reichstag come to a decision on a 
policy to end the war. The Berliner Tageblatt demanded that the 
Chancellor resign as he had not been strong enough to keep the military 
out of politics, 53 Theodor Wolff, the editor of that paper, observed 
of the Chancellor 1 s speech: 
Count Hertling's speech does not contain the 
slightest hint of that reform of the Empire, of 
questions of democratization and parlia1nentariza-
tion or of any of the abundant ideas arising today in 
the midst of our people. How could he mention 
them to those to whom these things are so infinitely 
strange? A new day is dawning, whether one likes 
it or not. 54 
The Center Party was being pushed to accept the inclusion of the 
Social Democrats in the Government. The Germania hoped "that the 
future course of events will result in a renewed strengthening of Count 
Hertling's cabinet ... 1155 The Frankfurter Zeitung called for the 
formation of a new Government by the three main parties, the Social 
56 Democrats, the Center, and the People's Party. On the 25th of 
53
Berliner Tageblatt, January 26, 1918. 
54rbid., January 25, 1918. 
5 5Germania, January 25, 1918. 
56Frankfurter Zeitung, January 25, 1918. 
September, the Internationale Korrespondenz blasted the Center 
Party as follows: 
The Socialist Party has declared its readiness 
to enter a new Government under defini te conditions. 
That means that representatives of Social Democracy 
will in no case enter the exhausted Government of 
the exhausted Chancellor. The Center wants no new 
Government and no new Chancellor at present. The 
consequences of this attitude for the continuance of 
the Reichstag Majority cannot yet be estimated. 
A full fledged parliamentary crisis was developing. 
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Meanwhile, within the Government things were moving 
rapidl y. The Foreign Ministry 1s plan for an appeal to Wilson required 
time to reorganize the Government so as to avoid the appearance of 
precipitate action. Parl iamentary methods were being used to achieve 
this. However, the Army Command had come to conclusions of its 
own. On September 28, Hindenburg and L udendorff agreed that the 
·1·t ·t t· h · · d' t · t· 57 m1 1 ary s1 ua 10n was sue as to require :in unme 1a e arm1s ice. 
On the next day at Spa, L udendorff described the military situation 
in terms which gave van Hintze the impression that only an armistice 
could save the Army. That same day L udendorff and Hindenburg 
told the Kaiser that the Army needed an armistice. The Foreign 
Minister recommended that Wilson be asked to summon a peace con-
ference on the basis of the Fourteen Points, and that an armistice be 
requested. 58 The Kaiser approved and later in the day the first step 
57ursachen, II, 256, 365. 
58Ibid., pp. 264 - 265. 
was taken in organizing a government acceptable to Wilson by the 
resignation of Hertling. 
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The insistence of the Army Command on an immediate 
armistice at the same time that the civilian authorities were trying 
to change the Government caused a great deal of difficulty. Luden-
dorff and Hindenburg, with their usual myopia, could not understand 
that Wilson meant what he had said when he had insisted that a 
responsible government must be set up to supercede the military 
autocracy before negotiations could be entered into. 11 The Field 
Marshall and I, 11 said Ludendorff, "were not aware of the trend of 
opinion in Berlin (the opinion of the civilian authorities as to govern-
mental reform) when we decided upon the armistice and peace pro-
posals in the .evening of September 28. 1159 Ludendorff on October 1 
insisted that a note be sent at once, and on October 2, he informed 
the Government that the Army could not wait forty-eight hours longer. 60 
It was under such pressure that the new Government was formed. 
59Ludendorff, Urkunden, p. 523; Ursachen, II, 365. 
60Amtliche Urkunden, Documents 21, 22, 23, 27. 
CHAPTER V 
GERMANY SUBMITS TO THE FOUR TEEN POINTS 
October 1918 
The man chosen to form the new Government, institute 
constitutional changes, and arrange for an immediate armistice 
was Prince Maximillian of Baden. Although he was an aristocrat 
and a military man, he had a great deal of experience in parliamen-
tary government and a reputation for liberalism. He was the cousin 
of the Kaiser, heir to the throne of Baden, and for eleven years he 
had been the president of the Baden Diet. He had served as a 
general officer in 1914, and after retiring fro1n the Army because of 
illness, had devoted his time to Red Cross work which had improved 
the condition of foreign prisoners in Germany and of German prison-
ers abroad. His public dialog with Lord Lansdowne in the press 
made him a well known advocate of a peace of understanding. As a 
negotiator, he was probably as acceptable to the Allied Powers as 
anyone in Germany. The former American Ambassador to Germany 
at the time, James Watson Gerard, said of him: 
The Prince ... is one of the few high Germans 
who seems to be able to think like an ordinary human 
being .... Putting forward a man of Prince Maximil-
lian' s personality and views in the position of Chan-
cellor ... means a very definite attempt to seek peace 
and an abandonment of the P an-German policy. 
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Prince Max had a different idea of his role than that 
possessed by Ludendorff and Hindenburg. He and other informed 
people knew that his role as Chancellor was to be only an interim 
one. Ludwig Alpers, a Reichstag deputy, summed up the Prince ' s 
position exactly when he said: "Prince Max will now become Chan-
cellar but cannot remain so for long. He will have the opportunity 
to perform only one duty, conclude peace, and with that his mission 
. 1 
will be ended. 11 However, although the Prince knew he had to ask 
for an armistice, he did not expect to have to do so immediately. 
His idea was to proceed in an orderly manner with governmental 
reorganization and then go on to the business of peace making. 
When he came to Berlin on October 1, Haeften and von 
Hintze lost no time in enlightening him as to what the Army C ommand 
expected of him. At first he fought against sending a note as he 
needed time to reorganize the Government and was uncertain about 
the advisability of accepting the Fourteen Points as a basis for peace, 
for he suffered from no illusions as to what the possible consequences 
of such an acceptance were for the Empire. "An armistice offer", 
wrote the Prince, 11made any such peace step as I had contemplated 
impossible. I begged him (Haeften) to get General Ludendorff to change 
his mind. I must at least demand a fortnight to prepare the political 
1H. P. Hanssen, Diary of a Dying Empire, trans. 0. 0. 
Winther (Bloomington,: Indiana Univ;rsi ty P ress, 1955 ), p . 313. 
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ground at home and abroad. 112 
On the morning of October 3, Prince Max warned Hindenburg 
personally of the danger of dispatching a note and proposed that he 
instead, in his first speech to the Reichstag, give a detailed program 
of war aims in 11 close, but not undignified correspondence 11 with 
Wilson I s points and then request negotiations on that basis. 3 The 
Chancellor realized that such a move, although it would take longer, 
would avoid the psychological shock that a note would have. Hinden-
burg would not yield in his demand, upon which the Prince agreed to 
dispatch the note 11 only on the condition, that the Supreme Command 
states in writing ... that the military situation on the western frnnt 
no longer admits of a postpnnement of the dispatch of the note. 114 
The Field Marshall sent his reply the same day: 
The Supre1ne Command insists on its demand 
that a peace offer be made at once . .. the situation 
becomes daily more critical and may force the 
Supreme Command to take momentous decisions .... 
Every day wasted costs thousands of brave soldiers 
their lives. 5 
Consequently, the note was sent on the night of October 3. 
111 fought against the note, 11 said the Prince before the Council of 
Ministers on October 6, "first because I thought the time was premature; 
2Max of Baden, op. cit., II, 51. 
3 Ibid., p. 18. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid., p. 19. 
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secondly, because I wished to turn to the enemy in general. Now we 
must quietly consider the consequences. tt To Scheidemann he later 
said, "I sent it because I was forced to by the Supreme Command. I 
was opposed to this over-hasty cry for rescue, but have taken all 
the responsibility. 116 
The German note was sent through the Swiss Government 
over the personal signature of the Imperial Chancellor. 
The German Government requests the Presi-
dent of the United States of America to take steps 
for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents 
of this request, and to invite them to delegate pleni-
potentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. 
The German Government accepts, as a basis for the 
peace negotiations, the program laid down by the 
President of the United States in his message to 
Congress of January 8, 1918, and his subsequent 
pronouncements, particular ly in his address of 
September 2 7, 1918. In ·order to avoid further blood-
shed, the German Government requests the President 
to bring about the immediate conclusion of an armis-
tice on land, nn water and in the air. 7 
The German people were first informed of the note on October 
5, when the new Imperial Chancellor addressed an extraordinary 
session of the Reichstag. The Prince and his aides had exercised 
great care in preparing the speech. The first draft contained a de-
tailed analysis of the Fourteen Points. When it was read to the 
6 Amtliche Urkunden, Document No. 35, P. Scheideman, 
Der Zusammenbruch (Berlin: Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschatt, 1921), 
p.184; Max of Baden, op. cit., p. 22. 
7 Foreign Rel ations, 1918, Supplement 1, I, 338. 
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cabinet, it was opposed unanimously on grounds that an attempt to 
interpret the President's mind would only offend him and delay 
peace. The speech was, therefore, rewritten. 8 
The revamped speech avoided any attempt to interpret or 
investigate the nature of the Fourteen Points. The first part of the 
speech was an outline of the new Government's policy of constitu-
tional reform and peace. He specifically mentioned Alsace -Lorraine 
by announcing the intention to give that province the status of an 
independent state within the German Empire. But the most important 
part of the speech came last, the admission that the war was lost. 
For months a continuous, terrible, and 
rnurderous battle has been raging in the west. Thanks 
to the incomparable heroism in our Army, which will 
live on as an immortal, glorious page in the history 
of the German people •.. the front is unbroken .... But, 
just because we are inspired by this feeling and this 
conviction, it is also our duty to make certain that the 
murderous and bloody struggle be not protracted for a 
single day beyond the moment when the close of the 
war seems possible for us .... I have, therefore, not 
waited until this day to take an active step to further 
the idea of peace. Supported by the consent of all duly 
authorized institutions of the Empire and by the con-
sent of all our allies acting together with us, I sent on 
the night of October 4-5 (actually the night of October 
3 -4) through the mediation of Switzerland, a note to 
the President of the United States of America, in which 
I asked him to work for the restoration of peace and to 
communicate to this end with all the belligerent states .... 
It is directed to the President of the United States be-
cause, in his message of January 8, 1918, and in his 
later proclamations and especially in his speech in New 
York on September 27, he proposed a program for 
8Max of Baden, op. cit. ,pp, 31-42. 
general peace which we can accept as a basis for 
negotiation. I have taken this step toward salva-
tion not only of Germany but of all humanity, which 
has been suffering for years through the war, be-
cause the thoughts regarding the future well-being 
of the peopl es which were proclaimed by Mr. Wilson 
are in accord with the general ideas cherished by 
the new German Government and by the overwhelm-
ing majority of our nation. 9 
101 
The speech left the Reichstag stunned. However, that body maintained 
its discipline. No debate on the Chancellor's move followed. Fried-
rich Ebert, the Social Democrat, moved that discussion be postponed. 
The motion was carried and the Reichstag was adjourned. The only 
discordant note to be sounded at this meeting came from the Pole 
Wladislaus Seyda who, in opposing the move to adjourn, brought up 
Polish claims. 1 O 
While the German leaders were deciding to ask for an armis-
tice, there was a realization in the Allied camp that the conflict was 
approaching a conclusion. Wilson and House knew that, if the Wilsonian 
program were to be a success, it was necessary to get the Allies' con-
sent to it. House wrote to Wilson, 11 As the Allies succeed, your in-
fluence will diminish .... Therefore I believe that you should commit 
the -A,.llies now to as much of your programme as possible. 1111 It was 
decided, therefore, that the inauguration of the Liberty Loan Drive 
9 Amtliche Urkunden, Document No. 34a; Max of Baden, op. 
cit., p. 370. 
lOLokal Anzeiger, October 5, 1918. 
11 seymour, Intimate Papers, pp. 64-67. 
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would be the ideal time to make a public bid for such a commitment. 
Consequently, in a speech given at the Metropolitan Opera House in 
New York City on September 27, 1918, Wilson made his statement 
of the Five Particulars: 
First, the impartial justice meted out must involve 
no discrimination between those to whom we wish to 
be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. 
It must play no favorites .... 
Sec and, no special or separate interest of any single 
nation or any group of nations can be made the basis 
of any part of the settlement which is not consistent 
with the common interest of all. 
Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or 
special covenants and understandings within ..• the 
league of nations. 
Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no 
special selfish economic combinations within the 
league and no employment ..• of economic boyc ott ... 
except as the power of economic penalty ... may be 
vested in the League of Nations .... 
Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of 
every kind must be made known in their entirety to 
the rest of the world. 12 
For some unknown reason, the report of this speech was 
delayed in Germany. It was, however, disclosed to the German people 
on October 5, the same day that the Chancellor made his Reichstag 
address announcing his peace move. 
The liberal and left press in Germany welcomed the Chan-
cellar's speech, as it promised long advocated refonns and was an 
12Ibid. , pp. 68. 
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attempt at a peace of understanding. Ebert said, "October 5 is really 
regarded as the turning point in German· history. It is the birthday of 
German d0mocracy. 1113 However, the papers almost unanimously 
warned that the war was not over. The Vossische Zeitung reminded 
the nation that its fate was now 11 placed in the hands of President 
Wilson";. there was no assurance that peace would follow from this 
fir st step. 14 The Vorwaerts of October 5 said: 
It can in no wise be assumed that President 
Wilson I s Fourteen Points in his speech of January 
8, 1918, are disposed of by the Five Points of the 
new speech. Amongst these Fourteen Points, twelve 
were acceptable from the beginning, and two relative 
to Alsace -Lorraine and Poland were difficult of 
settlement. Meanwhile, it may be noted that the 
realization of the old Social Democratic demand to 
grant autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine means in prac-
tice a big concession, and that free navigation on 
the Vistula and guaranteed access to the sea has been 
promised to the new Poland. 
In its issue of October 6, the paper reprinted the Fourteen Points and 
commented: 
It cannot be denied that the Wilson program 
contains details foreign to our accustomed ideas and 
feelings, but it offers us such great advantages also 
that the sacrifices are justified. Wilson I s program 
must be considered as a whole. It means the final 
abandonment of might in politics on all sides, and the 
victory of the new international justice, and as such 
is acceptable to the new Germany which is ready to 
co-operate in the construction of a new world .... 
What does it matter when all land is to belong, so to 
13R d' 't 85 u 1n, op.~• p. . 
14vossische z.eitung, October 5, 1918 . 
.. 
speak, to all, and when one can get c otten, copper, 
and petrol eum just as well from foreign countri es 
as from one's own country, and when one can sell 
cotton g o ods, nails, and machines abroad just as 
well as at home, and when no danger of war menaces 
these assured peaceful relations ? That is in the 
main the purport of President Wilson 1s program, 
and this is therefore as a whole a c ceptabl e; n:iuch 
more as a whole than in isolated detached parts. 
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Thus the Social D emocrats managed to avoid the full admission that 
the acceptance of the Wilsonian program meant a lienation of Reich 
territory by emphasizing the advantages to be gotten from the pro-
gram as a whole. 
Theodor Wolff, in the Berliner Tageblatt, expressed con-
cern whether Wilson, now that military success was within his grasp, 
woul d be as i dealistic as he former l y was. 
It is unthinkabl e that Wilson can mistake 
in our new Chancellor's peace offer the sincerity, 
the warm humanitarianism, the sense of justice, 
and the feeling of freedom. But is not Wilson 
b linded by the sun of military success? Clemenceau 
already declares that no peace is possible. Will 
Wilson oppose the patriarch who attempts to dictate 
his reply. 15 
The most interesting and thoughtful comment was that which 
appeared in the Vossische Zeitung under the heading " A Dark Day". 
It was written by Walther Rathenau, the German industrialist-
intellectual. 
' Our demarche was over hasty .... The 
answer will c ome, i t will be negative and 
15 Berliner Tageblatt , O ctober 7, 1918 . 
' 
humiliating, and will demand too much. We must 
not be surprised if the immediate evacuation of 
the west, if not of A l sace-Lorraine, is demanded. 
President Wilson I s Eighth Point will be interpreted 
as an abandonment of Lorraine at least, and 
probably also of Alsace. Danzig may be meant as 
a Polish port. The restoration of Bel gium and 
Northern France may run to a disguised war in-
demni ty of fifty billi ons. Was that taken into 
account? 
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The article conc l uded by declaring: "We want peace but not subjec -
tion. 11 Rathenau recommended a levee en masse to prepare for an 
unfavorable answer. 16 
The Koe l n i sche Zeitung called the Prince ' s speech in 
actuality a "call of the people for an honorable peace " . The paper 
did, however, point out that there were certain discrepancies between 
the Government ' s program and Wilson's. 17 
In the annexationist press, both Wilson ' s Five Parti culars 
Speech and the Chancellor's speech were attacked. The Post observed: 
Wilson ' s poi nts have a fair sound, and the 
Germans have no reason to avoid discussion. The 
closing statement as to the final triumph of justice 
and fair dealing, transl ated from Wilsonian phrase-
ology into p l a i n l angu age, means a brutal profession 
of Lloyd George ' s kno ck-out p olic y .•.. our democrats 
have wished the experiment .•.. We do not believe that 
democratic America, Engl and, and France will be in 
the least conscious of the democratic ideal when the 
German d emocrats come to them as p etitioners. 18 
16vossische Zeitu ng, October 7, 1918. 
17K o e l nische Zeitung, October 6, 1918. 





The Taegliche Rundschau connected the Wilson speech with 11 the new 
peace proposal of the princely democrat••. The paper surmised that 
the new foreign policy was framed with the Fourteen Points in mind. 
Commenting further on the Five Particulars Speech, it said: 11 The 
whole speech awakens the gravest doubts because of the new insults 
to Germany coined for the benefit of his audience. 11 19 In the 
Berliner Tageszeitung, the annexationist stalwart Ernst Reventlow 
said: nunvanquished Germany requests peace and grants the enemy 
chief full authority as only the vanquished may and can. If the present 
defeatist sentiments prevail, the loss of the war and the German 
future are inevitable. uZO 
However, there was some acceptance of the new conditions 
in the chauvinistic -annexationist press. The Lokal Anzeiger gave its 
qualified approval of the Chane ellor Is action. 
A statesman rejecting the present peace offer 
would reject the offer of the German people. It is 
impossible to express more clearly that the program 
of the enemies I moral leader has been accepted. Wil-
son Is Points Eight and Thirteen, however, may be 
considered to be rejected as contradicting the July 
Resolution which now, as before, the whole German 
nation regards as the basis of peace negotiations. If 
the Entente now rejects Germany 1 s maximum conces-
sions they cannot, as in Wilson's speech of January 8, 
claim that their program contains nothing limiting 
Germany's greatness. 21 
l 9Taegliche Rundschau, October 5, 1918. 
ZOBerliner Tageszeitung, October 6, 1918. 
21 Lokal Anzeiger, October 6, 1918. 
.. 
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In the same vein, the three chauvinist and anti-American 
newspapers in Hamburg grudgingl y accepted the Chancellor's action. 
The Hamburger Nachrichten commented: 
Wilson I s proposals relating to Alsace-
Lorraine and Pol and are rather serious for 
Germany. It will be easy to defend the German 
standpoint that the western and eastern provinces 
are integral parts of Germany, as we are not 
conscious of any injustice to France, and the 
eastern provinces, especially the old Hanseatic 
town of Danzig, are not unquestionably populated 
by Poles. 
The paper then attacked Catholic South Germany for interfering in 
North German affairs by saying: 
The government, in wh ich the Center 
Party plays the biggest part, expl ains its well-
known program in which Prussia is to be con-
sidered an imperial province and governed by 
the Reichstag. If the Government succeeds in 
bringing us a prosperous peace, we will gladly 
give it our acknowledgement. 22 
The Hamburgischer Korrespondent assumed that the Government action 
resulted fro1n the deteriorated military, political, and economic posi-
tion of the Quadruple Alliance. However, the paper blamed the Gov-
ernment for concealing the true situation and held it responsible for 
any "wave of pessimism 11 which would sweep over the nation. 23 The 
Hamburger Fremdenblatt supported the Chancellor I s note and 
observed that 
22Hamburger Nachrichten, October 6, 1918. 
2 3Hamburgische Korrespondent, October 6, 1918 . 
Wilson would give the lie to the professions 
of his Fourteen Points and his previous speeches 
if he replies to this peace note in the same 
manner as has been hitherto done by the Entente, 
or if he merely cynically remarked that Ger-
many's power of resistance must first be broken. 24 
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In at least some portions of the Pan-German and annexationist press 
then, there was an acceptance, with reservations, of the changed 
situation and of Wilson's program as the best way out of that situation. 
In the United States and the Allied countries, public opinion 
was generally in favor of a direct refusal of Germany's offer. The 
press in the United States, which country was the "white hope 11 of 
the peace forces in Germany, was particularly bellicose. In the 
United States Senate, such big guns as Senators Henry Cabot Lodge 
and Miles Poindexter declared "that an armistice now would mean 
25 
the loss of the war". If Wilson had not felt that the cause of 
humanity would be best served by taking up the opportunity offered, 
peace would not have been made. An additional factor complicated 
the picture for Wilson. Congressional elections were to be held in 
November. A lesser man might have bowed to expediency. 
After consultation with House, Robert Lansing, and Joseph 
Tumulty, Wilson sent a rep.y on October 8. The note, while not 
accepting categorically the German proposals, intimated strongly 
24Hamburger Fremdenblatt, October 6, 1918. 
25New York Tribune, October 8, 1918; Seymour, Intimate 
Papers, IV~. -
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that the United States would consider it seriously. The note asked 
whether the Germans accepted the Fourteen Points and the subse-
quent addresses as a basis for peace. Discussions on the points 
was to be held only to determine the practical details of their 
application. This was not as much a question as a notification that 
there would be no discussion of the meaning of the Fourteen Points 
themselves. Also, the President called for an evacuation of Belgium 
and France as a preliminary to an armistice. Finally he asked the 
Chancellor if there had really been a change in the constitution of 
the German Government. 2 6 
The note was published in the German newspapers on 
October 10. The Vorwaerts expressed the view that as a result of 
the reply, there was an improvement in the chances for peace and 
reflected that peace negotiations could not be hurried. Commenting 
on the President's first question, it said: 11In saying that we accept 
a program as the basis of discussions, we declare that we adopt it 
in principle and that it is only a que~tion of the execution of details. 112 7 
In discussing Wilson's answer, the Berliner Zeitung ~ 
Mittag, while acknowledging Wilson's good faith, cast doubt on the 
willingness of his allies to accept his program. 
Up to the present we have not heard anything 
26Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement..!:_, I, 343. 
27 Vorwaerts, October 11, 1918 . 
which shows that they have considered their views, 
as they must also do. The English and French 
press, almost without exception, storms and rages, 
and it does not need a very fine ear to distinguish 
that they are raging against an honest and straight-
forward application of Mr. Wilson's points . . .. 
The question, therefore, arises whether the other 
leaders of the Entente are ready to enter into peace 
discussions on the basis of Mr. Wilson ' s program. 28 
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The Frankfurter Zeitung was more specific than most comment by 
br ing ing up· Points E i ght and Thirteen: 
Two questions now come under consideration 
for Germany. Mr. Wilson will have to agree, 
particularly as regards to Alsace-Lorraine, to a 
solution whi ch does not open new wounds. In the 
Polish question it cannot be overl o oked that more 
Germans than Poles live in territories which were 
formerly parts of the Kingdo m of P oland. 29 
Walther Rathenau continued his opposition and considered 
the demand for evacuation of occupi ed terr i tory as a demand equivalent 
to unconditional surrender whi ch woul d make it easier for the Allies 
to increase their demands on Germany. Prince Max himself was 
r elieved by the answer, having feared an unhappy outcome to the step 
w h ich he had taken against his will. 3o 
A lthough the Wilson note had not been negative, it did hold 
conditions which meant the defin ite defeat of Germany. To accept the 
evacuation stipulation w ou l d leave Germany with no bargaining position 
28 Berliner Zei tung am Mittag, O ctober 10, 1918. 
29Frankfurter Zeitung, October 12, 1918. 
30 Max of Baden, op. cit. , Vol. II, pp. 65 - 66 . 
--
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at any ~onference. A careful and studied reply was necessary. 
Therefore, on the same day that the note was received, October 9, 
a conference of the military and civil authorities was called. 
Ludendorff was not coherent for he described the military situation 
as unfavorable yet expressed the idea that the Army would not 
collapse and that he could hold the front for three months more. 
From the conference the Prince gathered that the Army wanted the 
negotiations continued although it meant evacuation. As a conse -
quence, a reply was drafted which accepted the President's conditions. 
It was sent on October 12. The Fourteen Points were accepted as a 
basis for peace and assurances were asked that the other Allied 
Governments agreed with them. It expressed willingness to evacuate 
Allied territories and left it to the President to "occasion the meeting 
of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements con -
cerning the evacuation". The note also informed the President that 
"the Chancellor ... speaks in the name of the German Government and 
of the German people". 31 
In commenting on the German answer, the press of the 
Government block emphasized the fact that the note had met with the 
full approval of the Army Command as well as all the State Secretaries 
(cabinet members) and the Reichstag Majority. This was evidently 
done to combat the propaganda of the Pan-German press to the effect 
3 1Foreign Relations, 1918, Supple:rr1.mt ..!:_, I, 357-358. 
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that pacifists were beh ind the peace moves. The Frankfurter Zeitung 
prophetically gave the reason for destroying the legend before it 
became rooted. 
It is necessary to oppose this view ( of 
pacifist instigation) from the very beginning, a 
view which could develope into a dangerous .legend, 
and it can be expressly confirmed that the Army 
Command has had no share in the constr'(lll.ction 
of this legend. 32 
The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung explored the steps necessary 
f or a "correct application11 of the Fourteen Points. 
The prohibition of the secret international 
agre e m ents demands from the statesmanship of all 
parties participating the renunciation of an ancient 
method of the old Power -policy which up to the 
present had always been looked upon as indispensible. 
The fr 'eedom of navigation first of all makes the sea 
an element which unites all the nations; renunciation 
of the weapons of boycott in the commercial life of 
nations guarantees to the nations which are less 
favored an account of their geographical situation 
the certainty of being able to develop, and a new 
concept of the character of the colonies might balance 
the injustic of any historical developments. The com-
bination of all the cultured nations into one union may 
become the means and the organ by which those prin-
ciples may be accomplished, and general disarmament 
. bl . 33 1s a ess1ng .... 
The Progressive Party Boer sen Kurier said of the reply that the 
acceptance of the Fourteen Points was a courageous acceptance of 
the situation. And it added 11that President Wilson 1s principles impose 
32Frankfurter Zeitung, Octobrr 11, 1918. 
33Nordd~utsche Allgemeine Zeitung, October 13, 1918. 
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a check on the war aims of all Chauvinists under whatever banner 
they may serve .... Our only aim now is a reasonable compromise. 1134 
The Vossische, in line with Rathenau 1s article, pointed out that as a 
result of the acceptance of Wilson's principles a number of questions 
which were "painful to the German patriot" arose. Both Alsace-
Lorraine and German Poland were now international questions. 35 
The Koelnische Volkszeitung hoped that in exchange for Germany's 
acceptance of the Fourteen Points and evacuation, Germany would 
receive the "advantages of a lasting peace". 36 Another Centrist 
paper, the Germania, saw in the acceptance of Wilson's principles 
and evacuation a rejection of the 11pawn11 theory of using occupied 
territory as a bargaining advantage in negotiations. In return for 
evacuation , Germany would receive "participation in the colonial 
possessions of the Great Powers, a safeguarding of freedom of the 
seas, and an open door to world trade. All this was guaranteed by 
President Wilson's Fourteen Points. 1137 Evidently, the official organ 
of the Center Party had changed its opinion greatly since January, 
191 8. 
Among the Pan-Germans and annexationists, the German 
34Boersen Kurier, October 13, 1918. 
35vossische Zeitung, October 13, 1918. 
36Koelnische Volkszeitung, October 14, 1918. 
37 Germania, October 14, 1918 . 
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reply was greeted with consternation. The Conservative Party issued 
a declaration in the Reichstag denouncing the evacuation of the 
occupied area before an "honorable peace 11 was made. 38 The Bund 
der Landwirte, an organization of large landholders, issued a similar 
declaration. 39 The Lokal Anzeiger expressed shock at the Govern-
ment' s unconditional acquiescence in the proposal for an evacuation 
of occupied territories. The paper had some interesting observations 
to mak e on the acceptance .of Wilson's principles: 
Both these questions (Poland and Alsace -
Lorraine) must be solved on the general principles 
which President Wilson drew up in his speech of 
February 12, the second of which says: '.'Provinces 
and peoples must not be bandied about from one 
state to another as if they are me rely stones in a 
game. 11 The third principle of the speech in question 
says: "Every solution of territorial questions which 
may arise on account of this war must be dealt with 
in the interests of and to the advantage of the people 
concerned, and not as a portion of a mere agreement 
or compromise in the claims of rival states." It 
certainly follows that the questions of Alsace-Lorraine 
and Poland 1nust be solved by the application of these 
principles. And also the fourth of these principles 
is to be taken into account in the solution of these 
questions. This demands that the national claims 
should meet with the most far -reaching satisfaction 
possible, it is true, but a limit should be put to this 
satisfaction. The claims should not go so far as to 
lead to stipulations which might again disturb the 
peace of Europe. 
Thus, with a prescience unusual for what was generally a yellow 
38naily Review, October 1918, p. 667. 
39 neutsche Tageszeitung, October 13. 1918. 
115 
journalistic sheet, the Lokal Anzeiger touched on the problem which 
was to eventually damage Wilson's program, the inability to apply 
the Four Principles and subsequent declarations to the Fourteen 
40 
Points. 
As usual, Reventlow held out in his opposition to any peace 
other than a German victory: 
Quite apart from its fundamental enormity, 
there is absolutely no compensation for our readi-
ness to submit the question of Alsace-Lorraine and 
that of Ptmssian P oland to President Wilson's de-
cision . . .. The German reply, in fact, so far as it 
can, puts the future of Germany and Alsace-Lorraine 
in the President 's hands ... : We, for our part, have 
not yet abandoned the hope that such a development 
of things will still be prevented before this 11peace 
of justice" in the name of a League of Nations and 
a new era ruins the Empire. 41 
The Morgen Post considered the German reply an admission that the 
Alsace -Lorraine and the Polish questions were international ones and 
also an admission of Germany 1 s defeat, a diplomatic one at that and 
·1·t 42 not a m1 1 ary one. 
In line with their changed stand, the three Hamburg news-
papers gloomily greeted the German acceptance of Wilson 1s demands 
and relied on Wilson 1 s good faith while casting doubt on that of his 
allies. The Hamburger Nachrichten hoped that the German 
40Loka1Anzeiger, October 13, 1918. 
41 neutsche Tageszeitung, October 13, 1918. 
42Morgen. Post, October 13, 1918. 
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negotiators would have some room to maneuver and perhaps save the 
old German towns in Poland for Germany. The paper hoped that the 
President 's mention of opposition to any arbitrary power would apply 
to England, the enemy of the commercial and maritime interests of 
43 
Hamburg. 
When the President received the note on October 13, it at 
first seemed that the war was ended. However, after closer study 
it was realized that the problem was not that simple. The note, 
although it appeared as a compl ete capitulation, contained a veiled 
counter-proposal which could have had vital military results. A 
11mixed commis sion11 to arrange the conditions of evacuation was 
proposed. Such a body could have been used by the Germans to delay 
evacuation and provide the tired German Armies with a much needed 
respite. This proposal was Ludendorff 1s idea and was in line with 
his purely military appraisal of the situation, Besides this difficulty, 
an event occurred which seriously threatened negotiations. On October 
12, the day before the German reply was sent, a passenger-carrying 
Irish vessel, the Leinster, was torpedoed without warning by a German 
submarine. Among the 450 lives lost were 135 women and children 
43Hamburger Nachrichten, October 13, 1918. The mention 
of opposition to "arbitrary power 11 was a reference to Point Two of 
Wilson's Four Points Speech of July 4, 1918, at Mount Vernon, 
Virginia. These Four Points, together with the Four Principles of 
February 11, 1918, and the Five Particulars of September 27, 1918, 
were clarifications of the Fourteen Points. The Four Points are 
given in Appendix C. 
117 
and some Americans. 11 Since the days of the Lusitania", wrote 
P rince Max, "the sorrow and fury in England and America had never 
r e ached such heights. 1144 In the United States, an almost universal 
cry went up for "unconditional surrender". Theodore Roosevelt 
called for a repudiation of the Fourteen Points. "These Fourteen 
P oints", said the former President, 11 are couched in such vague 
language that many of them mean anything, or nothing, and have a 
merely rhetorical value, while others are absolutely mischievous. 1145 
Added to the hue and cry at home, the President had to face the 
discontent of the Allies, who had drafted a note to him urging that 
sim ple evacuation of invaded territory would not be a sufficient 
basis for an armistice. 
The reply to the Germans was drafted on October 14, during 
a long conference. Wilson was uneasy and knew that he had to pro-
ceed carefully, beset as he was on all sides. "I never saw him more 
disturbed, 11 said Col onel House .11 .•• {He was) anxious not to close the 
door, and yet de sired to make the note as strong as the ace as ion re -
quired. 1146 Wilson I s second note rejected the mixed commission idea. 
Terms of evacuation "must be left to the judgement and advice of the 
military advisors of the Government of the United S1a.tes and the 
44Max of Baden, op. cit. , p. 84. 
45New York Times, October 14, 1918. - - ---
46seymour, Intimate Papers, IV, 82-83. 
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Allied Governments. 11 Any armistice granted was to provide 
"ab solutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance 
of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States 
and the Allies in the field". There could be no agreement as long as 
G erman subm arines continued to sink passenger ships and the retreat-
ing armies destroyed property. Finally, the note referred to Wilson's 
IVIount Vernon speech of July 4, 1918, in which he had asked for the 
"destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that 
can separately, secretly, and of its single choice 
disturb the peace of the world .... " The power which 
has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the 
sort here described .... It is indispensible that the 
governments associated against Germany should know 
beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing. 47 
While waiting for the reply from Washington, the German home 
fr ont was crumbling fast. The Pan-Germans organized demonstrations 
protesting the peace move. On October 16, a counter-demonstration 
of a thousand workers was held outside the Reichstag. A financial 
crisis was developing, banks were failing, and people were cashing in 
their war certificates. Quotations on industrial stocks were falling 
rapidly. A shortage of newsprint led to a restriction of the size of 
daily newspapers. On October 8, railway service was cut and people 
were warned against unnecessary travel. The same day the butter 
r ation was reduced to twenty grams a week in Berlin. Disease continued 
47 Foreign Relations, Supplement_!_, I, 538-539; Amtliche 
Urkunden, Document 48. 
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to spread. On October 15, 1, 722 deaths from influenze occurred in 
the capital. Some 10, 000 people were laid up with that disease alone, 
and many schools were closed because of it. 4 8 
Wilson 1 s second note caused consternation in the German 
camp. It was manifest that Wilson, as well as his allies, demanded 
a complete German defeat. Andre Tardieu, the French politician, 
wrote of the effect of the note: 
In a single page the whole poor scaffolding 
of the Great German Staff is overthrown. The 
armistice and peace are not to be means of delaying 
a disaster and of preparing revenge. On the main 
question itself, the reply must be Yes or No! If it 
is No, war will continue, as it has gone on for the 
past three months, by Allied victories. If it is Yes, 
the military capitulation must be immediate and 
complete by the acceptance pure and simple of terms 
which will be fixed by the military advisors of the 
Allies alone. 49 
Prince Max described the effects of Wilson 1s note in terms no less 
emphatic: 
Not a word in this terrible document recalled 
the high office of arbitrator to which the President 
has aspired .... Wilson's note altered the situation in 
Germany fundamentally. The internal peace which 
had been newly cemented went to pieces. With our 
offer longing for peace became the ruling passion of 
the masses. Many had only dammed up their im-
patience into a momentary self-control. Only the 
supposed nearness of peace had kept them back from 
48Rudin, op. cit., p. 127. 
49 A. Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty (Indianapolis: 
The Bobbs -Merril Company, 1921), p. 54-. -
unpatriotic words and deeds. And now disappoint-
ment work ed like the bursting of a dam. 50 
The press of the Government parties was shocked. The 
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V o r waerts, which had been a leading advocate of the peace moves, 
w arned the Allies of "overstraining the bow 11 • 51 Theodor Wolff 
expressed disappointment in Wilson for talking over the language of 
the power -politician. The Berliner Zeitung am Mittag ran an article 
by R eichstag Deputy Georg Gothein which evaluated Wilson's note as 
a death blow to a League of Nations. 
The German people gave its adherence with 
full confidence to Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points 
and is resolved to carry them out honestly if it 
meets with like confidence from the other side. 52 
The liberal Frankfurter Zeitung said the note showed that the influence 
o f Georges Clemenceau and Lloyd George had been at work. 53 The 
sem i-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung hoped that despite the 
n ote the German Government would be "guided by a spirit of concilia-
t ion and by its desire for an end of bloodshed. 1154 
The anti-Government press was vociferous in its reaction. 
The nationalist Taegliche Rundschau called the note "the Caudine yoke 
50Max of Baden, op. cit., p. 89. 
51 vorwaerts, October 16, 1918. 
52
Berliner Zeitung a~ Mittag, October 16, 1918. 
53 Frankfurter Zeitung, October 16, 1918. 
54Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, October 16, 1918 .. 
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o£ .i:v1r. Wilson". 55 The Pan-German Lokal Anzeiger said that 
~..,.v-ilson seemed to have abandoned his idealism the first time it was 
p ._;:,_ t to the test. 
He who is able to speak a word that would 
bring peace to the world and fails to do so, although 
all the conditions which he himself has laid down 
!0 r the termination of the war have .been fulfJfed, 
18 atleast as guilty as he who unchains war· 
~_:he Kreuz Zeitung said, "Even the Republicans (German advocates 
o£ a Republic) cannot agree to his demands. He wants to deSt roy us, 
ric::>t only our monarchs. 11 57 
On October 16, encouraged by Wilson's harsh terms, the 
C c::>nservative Party issued a manifesto stating that Wilson had left 
tJ:-i..e people no choice but to continue the war. If not, 
for generations to come every German citizen and 
peasant, every man of business and of property, 
and above all, every employee and laborer would 
be the wage slaves of our enemies. 58 
0~ the same day, the Rheinische Westfaelische Zeitung reported that 
a.-~ sociation of Krupp officials had telegraphed the Chancellor that in 
...-...,-:i- ew of Wilson 1 s note he should take all measures necessary to 
0 :i:-ganize a national defense. 
55
Taegliche Rundschau, October 16, 1918. 
56
Lokal Anzeiger, October 16, 1918. 
57K Z . reutz e1tung, October 16, 1918. 
58 
Frankfurter Zeitung, October 17, 1918; Max of Baden, 
o:12· cit., pp. 411-413. 
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To counteract these moves, the Social Democrats issued a 
counter-appeal supported by the professors of the University of 
Berlin. The party admitted that "Germany and the Ge rrnan people are 
in danger f b • "f" to the lust for conquest found in the o ecoming a sacri ice 
English and French chauvinists and imperialists. · · · 
11 
The party 
claimed to be at work to get a peace of understanding and was parti-
cipating in a peaceful revolution to transform the country into a 
democracy. It called on the people to oppose the Pan- Germans and 
Conservatives . "We are on the way to peace and democracy. All 
rebellious a g itation blocks this way and serves the counter-revolution. 1159 
It took the German Government a week to a nswer. L uden -
do r ff, who had instituted the armistice moves, had now changed his 
mind. Things had not developed as he had wished. Wilson had not 
done h is bidding a nd given hi1n a breathing spell in which to rest his 
armies. 11 ••• we should not accept any conditions that would appear 
to make a resumption of hostilities impossible, 11 wrote Ludendorff. 60 
On October 20, the day the third German note was sent, H indenburg 
warned the Chancellor by phone that Wilson's terms meant complete 
d e feat. But by this time the prestige of the military was low among 
the membe"t"s of the Government. Ludendorff was especially suspect. 





-Lutz , op. cit . , pp. 400-403; Vossische Zeitung, October 
60 
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painted a gloomy picture at the beginning of the month, he was now 
more sanguine, probably because he had learned that 600, 000 
reinforcements could be available in a short time by combing out the 
home front. Scheidemann remarked that his hopeful and happy condi-
tion was probably caused by the prospect of having so many new lives 
to feed to the death-dealing machines of the enemy. Hans Delbruek, 
the German historian, maintained that 11Ludendorff was such a 
muddlehead that he never did know what he really wanted". 61 Wilhelm 
Sol£, the new Foreign Minister, asked why there had been such a 
change in the situation after the Supreme Command had insisted on 
and supported a peace proposal. 
Now an answer from Wilson has arrived 
which puts us face to face with the most serious 
decisions, and at once the picture undergoes a 
change - -showing that we can now hold our own, 
that if we can survive the next four weeks, we 
shall even be in a much better position than be-
fore .... What is the real reason, a thing can be 
done now which a short time ago was declared 
. 'bl 62 1mposs1 e. 
The Prince and his ministers, therefore, decided that they 
must yield to Wilson. The Prine e felt that now that peace was within 
their gra sp, the German people could think of nothing else. "Luden-
dor££ •.. wanted to turn backi so did I, 11 wrote Prince Max, 11but 
6 l scheidema.nn, ~- ~ , pp. 180-187; Ursachen, III, 320. 
6 2 Am.tliche Urkunden, Document 62 , 
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there was no room to turn. 1163 Consequently, on October 18, he, 
together with his legal advisor, Dr. Simons, drafted the German 
reply. After two days of debate, during which his ministers tried 
to :tnod"f 1 sent on the evening of October 20. 
1 y it, the note was final y 
Th ·t · asking the e note accepted the evacuation of occupied terri ories, 
President 11to bring about an opportunity for fixing the detailS" · The 
note denied that the German Armies destroyed property a nd lives 
wantonly and stated that they "are under the strictest instructions 
to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to 
the best of their ability11. While denying that the German Navy had 
ever purposely destroyed lifeboats, the German Government said it 
had ordered its submarine commanders not to sink passenger ships 
II• 1 n order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace11 • 
Lastly, the note stated that to eliminate every 11arbitrary power 
that can ... disturb the peace of the world11 , the German Government 
had laid before the Reichstag 11 a bill to alter the Constitution of the 
Empire so that the consent of the representatives of the people is 
required for decisions of peace and war1'. 64 
The day previous to the sending of the German reply, October 
19, the Germans learned what was in store for Austria-Hungary and 
perhaps for them. On that day, the President belatedly answered 
63 
Max of Baden, op. cit. , II, 152. 
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llstrians 
who had also sent him an appeal for an armistice. 
told t He 
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he:rn that 
T • because of developments, he had to modify Point 
en of th 
e .Fourt p . . een 01nts whi ch had asked for "the freest oppor-
tu.ni ty for 
auto no rnous deve1opment11 for the peoples of the Dual 
Monarchy-. 
This autonomy was not enough for now "nationalistic 
aspirat· 
ions" h d 65 
this: 
a to be recogniz ed, The Lokal Anz eiger said of 
w-· The great disillusionment that President 
A llson I s reply to Count Burian has been for the 
G USt ro-Hungarian people must be regarded by the 
errnan people as a very serious warning. Presi-
dent Wilson ' s act is irreconcilabl e with the 
fundarnental basis of his program for peace. 66 
~ Zeitung stated that the note to Austri a -Hungary indicated 
that W-
ilson ct· 1d not feel himself b ound to adhere strictly to the Fourteen 
The 
Points. 67 
The German newspapers p rinted the German note on October 
21, 
rnany- of them witho ut making any co~ent. The Vorwaerts greeted 
the 
reply favorably, . "If our enemies are in earnest in their sayi ng: 
de sire for h th a peace of democ racy and impartial justic e, t en e way 
is 0 Pen for thern. ,, kf t r Zeitung stated that "if President The Fran u r e 
w·1  son ser · t· on of bloodshed and destruction, it 
lously desires a cessa 1 .· 
65
~ - , p. 368 
66
Lokal Anz e i ger, October 21 • 
19 18
· 
67-r:- . october 20, 1918. 
~ rank.furter Ze1tung, 
now lies in his hands." The Berliner Tageblatt wrote: 
The note goes with dignity and in a dignified 
way into every question which Wilson has put 
forward. If Wilson rejects the peace of violence 
which the Entente nationalities desire, and wants 
a peace of ~econciliation, then this note will offer 
him no occasion for a curt refusal. 
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The Koelnische Zeitung considered the U -Boat concession 11 an enormous 
one 11 and a 11 sufficient guarantee for him who is willing to reach an 
understanding11 • The Koelnische Volkszeitung saw in the note lffar 
reaching concessions 11 and added that now President Wilson and the 
Entente must 11proceed to concrete demands 11 • 
The press of the Right interpreted the note as a manifestation 
of weakness. 11 We have replied to the violence of President Wilson's 
note, 11 said the Taegliche Rundschau, ''with concessions and weakness. 11 
The Berliner Neuste Nachrichten declared that 11 Mr. Wilson has never 
desired peace 11 and it was "high time for the German Nation to wake up. 11 
The Deutsche Tageszeitung called the Government note "childish 11. 
Prince Max appeared before the Reichstag on October 22 to 
open its first meeting sine e October 5. This was a most important 
one, for it was the first opportunity for many to express their opinions 
publicly. The Chancellor first reviewed his actions in regard to peace. 
He stated that it was not-clear as yet from Wilson 1s notes whether or 
not the peace to come would be 11a peace of right or a peace of force11. 
Meanwhile, the German people must be prepared for the possibility 
'
1that the enemy Governments want to continue the war". 1The nation," 
continued the Prince, 11must not b e led blindfolded to the conference 
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table II Th . . 
· · e people had the right to ask what Wilson's conditions 
rneant for their future, The Chancellor did not agree with those who 
believed that Wilson's conditions "would mean subjection to a tribune 
hostile to Germany which 'would decide the question of right solely 
frorn the viewpoint of selfish interests". The heart of Wilson's 
Program was the League of Nations, which required the surrender 
by nations of a part of their sovereignty if justice for all were to be 
realized. 
If today in the hour of difficulty for our people 
I represent the idea of a League of Nations as a 
source of comfort and of new strength, I do not wish 
for a moment to brush aside the tremendous obstacles 
yet to be overcome. 
The rest of his address dealt with internal reforms such as 
"u . niversal 
' 
ff rt·p . equal, direct, and secret su rage in russia, autonomy 
for Alsace-Lorraine, and the institution of responsible parliamentary 
government in Germany. 68 
Unlike the previous meeting, this one could not avoid debate. 
Gustav Stresemann, leader of the National Liberal party, expressed 
his support of the Government. 69 Westarp of the Conservative Party, 
on the other hand, rejected reform and called on the Government to 
68Reichstag, Vol. 312, pp. 6159-6161; Max of Baden, ~-.=!.!:, 
II, 172-179. 
69Reichstag, p. 6172. Stresemann actuall: dist~usted Wilson 
and felt that the Fourteen Points would be u~ed by hun to increase the 
dernand G See his Vermaechtnis, der Nachlass (3 vol son ermany. :....::..---,,--::-""":-"".::--- -- ----- •, 
(Berlin: Ullstein, 1932), Vol. I, PP· 12 - 13 · 
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to rally the people in a last ditch struggle. 70 Ebert of the Social 
Democrats criticized the Government for not g oing far enough in its 
reform suggestions but complimented it for its answer to Wilson. 7 1 
Herold, speaking in the name of the Center Party, gave his party's 
full support to the Government. 72 Probably the most thoughtful 
analysis of the whole situation was put forth by the Progressive 
leader, Friedrich Naumann: 
In this serious phase of the fighting a double 
measure of the Fatherland's thanks is due to the Army. 
The old system did not make progress because it was 
unabl e to accomplish unity of Government and to em -
body the national ideal of liberty. The people thus 
lost the feeling of having a stable government, and 
abroad the feeling arose that we were not sincere. 
We were not insincere, however, but unorganized. In 
our new foreign policy, we must avoid ambiguity if we 
desire to enter the future league of mankind as a mem-
ber with full rights. We, too, are of the opinion that 
peace will not be attained by m ilitary means alone, 
but that the diplomatic and moral means of all mankind 
must be employed. Even if the idea of a League of 
Nations appears to many as not yet technically reason-
able, we must now treat this as a world problem. A 
nation that possesses such powers of labor, thought, 
and production as the German cannot be destroyed by 
those on the other side of the ocean. Let them try it; 
they will not succeed. But they can live in peace with 
us if they will. 73 
At the close of the session, a resolution of confidence in the Chancellor 
70ibid. , pp. 6178-6180. 
71 Ibid., p. 6161. 
72Ibid. , p. 6 174. 















The next day the debate was resume, Hasse of the Indepen-
dent Social Democrats was the first speaker. He seemed to take 
pleasure in the Government's predicament. 
The Peace Resolution must at last be buried, 
thundered Hasse. 
It cannot be brought into harmony with the President 
Wilson's principles .... We are in no way enthusiastic 
about President Wilson. His ideas, after all, will 
not change the capitalist order of society. The North 
Schl eswig question should be solved before it be-
comes a peace problem. The Poles' desires are not 
just. Their state allegiance must be fixed in 
accordance with the free will of the population. 74 
It was now the turn of the representatives of the national 
minorities in Germany to be heard. Deputy Stychel, speaking for the 
Poles, foresaw immediate difficulties between the Germ1:1.ns and his 
people in the construction of the new Polish State. "We welcome a 
peace of justice which is to exclude violence't, observed the Polish 
leader. 75 Dr. Richlin, an Alsatian deputy, rejected the proposed 
autonomy for Alsace -Lorraine and placed his trust in the solution 
offered by President Wilson's Fourteen P oints. " The Alsatian deputies 
support the assertion that the .Alsace-Lorraine question has become an 
international one." 76 The Dane, Hans Hans sen, expressed the hope 
7½eichstag, pp. 6 182-6190. 
75Ibid., pp. 6193-6197. 
76
Ibid. , pp. 6203 -6204. 
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that North Schleswig would get the right to a plebicite w h ich was 
promised in Article V of the Treaty of Prague of 1866. Although the 
Fourteen Points did not mention North Schleswig, this fighter for 
freedom felt that the spirit of the program covered the Danish Prob-
lem. 77 
Sol£, the Foreign Minister, answered the minorities at leng th. 
He admitted that both Alsace -Lorraine and the Polish question were 
included in the Fourteen Points and woul d, therefore, b e settled at the 
peace conference. However, North Schleswig did not come under the 
points as the adherence of that area to Germany had been accepted by 
the Danish Govern~ent in the agreements made in 1878 and 1907. 
When the Foreign Minister chided the Poles for their ingratitude to 
Germany, nne of the Polish deputies became so abusive that a member 
of the Right shouted, " Kick the dog out". 78 
Debate c ontinued into the next day. The Alsatian and Polish 
questions occupied a great deal of attention. The feeling of most of 
the German deputies, inc luding the Independent Social Democrats, 
was best expressed by the Progressive, Geor g Gothein. 
I do not abandon hope that the Alsace -Lorraine rs 
will again feel drawn toward Germany when German h a s 
become a people ' s state. The Polish den,ands do not 
correspond with President Wilson's message; the P olish 
manifesto is a direct distortion of the Thirteenth Point, 
77Ibid., p. 6205. 
78Ibid., p. 6206. 
which speaks only of territory with an undoubtedly 
Polish population. We all desire a League of Nations, 
but no League of Nations is compatible with a peace 
of violence. 79 
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For the first time during the correspondence with Germany, 
Wilson consulted his cabinet for advice on how to answer the new 
German note. The President was deeply disturbed by the attitude 
of the American press. Demands for punishment of the Germans 
were the order of the day. His advisors, as a whole, thought that 
the German proposal should be accepted. Consequently, on October 
23, the third American note was sent. 
Having received the solemn and explicit as-
surance of the German Government that it unreserv-
edly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his 
address to the Congress ... on the 8th of January, 
1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in 
his subsequent addrdsses .. ~ arrl that this wish and 
purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto 
dictated German policy ... but from ininisters who 
speak for the majority of the Reichsta g and for the 
overwhelming majority of the German people; and 
having received also the explicit promise that the 
hu1nane rules of civilized warfare will be observed ... 
the President ... feels that he cannot decline to take 
up with the Governments with which the Governrnent 
of the United States is associated the question of an 
armistice. 
The note ended by reiterating the point that the Allies would not deal 
with "the military masters and the monarchial autocrats of Germany. 11 80 
Prince Max considered the note a shrewd bit of maneuvering. 
79Ibid., p. 6208. 
BOForeign Relations, 1918, Suppl~ment 1, I, 381-383. 
Its language was that used by one 
who regards his enemy's resistance as broken. And 
the worst of it was ... (that) our people have been so 
far broken that in this 11humiliating11 note with its 
11 excessive demands", they will discover no incen-
tive to fight to the bitter end. 81 
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Lude~dorff wrote that it was ''a telling answer to our unmanly atti-
t d 11 82 u e . The members of the Conservative Party in the Reichstag 
addressed a resolution to the Chancellor stating : 
Wilson's note made public today demands an 
unconditional surrender, the abdication of the Kaiser, 
the dismissal of the Army commanders, and our com-
plete submission to a peace of force. Germany is 
first to be dishonored and disarm.ed, and then 
humiliated. The acceptance of these conditions 
would surrender every German for generations to 
a deprivation of political rights and to economic 
slavery .... German honor commands the Go vern-
ment to reject such demands; the security of the 
Empire requires the Government to summon the 
people to their final battle. 83 
In the daily press opinion was divided. The Vorwaerts said: 
For us Social Democrats, the situation is 
completely clear. The former constellation of 
power in the German Empire we always re g a r ded 
as dangerous.-.,. and pressed for a radical chang e. 
The time has now come to draw the consequences 
ruthlessly demanded by the needs of the German 
people. After we have accepted President Wilson I s 
program, it would be absurd to oppose it by armed 
force. 84 
81Max of Baden, op. cit., II, 188 . 
82 
Ludendorff, Erinnervngen, p. 611 
83 FrankfUJfter Zeitung , October 25, 1918. 
84vorwaerts, October 26, 1918. 
The Frankfurter Zeitung pointed out that the Entente powers had 
never accepted the Fourteen Points and stated that the conditions 
for an armistice would be severe. 
They are conditions which a free and brave 
people can accept only when it must and there is 
no sense in concealing the fact that these notes and 
answers from Wilson are certainly the most 
humiliating thing Germany has experienced since 
the days of Napoleon. 85 
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The nationalist Taegliche Rundshau found Wilson's demands 
for capitulation and the removal of monarchical and military authority 
intolerable. "We must", affirmed the paper, "whether we wish it or 
not, prepare for the final fight for life and honor. 11 86 The Lokal 
Anzeiger urged the Government to learn the exact armistice conditions 
immediately so as to know whether to accept or reject them. 87 
Ludendorff and Hindenburg now took matters in their own 
hands and tried to save the nation from an outbreak of peace. A 
proclamation was issued to the troops on October 24 urging a rejection 
of Wilson's demands as "unacceptable to us soldiers". 88 As a conse-
quence of this message to the troops, the First Quartermaster General 
was relieved of his command. Hindenburg remained. The Vorwaerts 
85Frankfurter Zeitung, October 25, 1918. 
86Taegliche Rundschau, October 25, 1918. 
8 7Lokal Anzeiger, October 2 5 , 1918. 
88Amtliche Urkunden, Document 76b. 
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hopefully interpreted the dismissal as the "exclusion of the soldier 
from politics 11 • 89 
With the dismissal of Ludendorff, Prince Max was in a 
· better position to send Wilson the kind of reply that he considered the 
situation demanded. On October 27, the fourth and final German 
note to .Wilson was sent, a note which was a complete acceptance of 
Wilson's terms. The note stated that the peace negotiations were 
being handled by 11 a govermnent of the people in whose hands rests ... 
the authority to make decisions 11 • The note concluded: "The German 
Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice, which is the 
first step toward a peace of justice, as described the President in 
his pronouncements. 11 90 
As usual, the press interpreted the October 27 note accord-
ing to the lights of its party affiliation. The Vorwaerts declared the 
note contained an appeal to the sense of justice of peoples: 
A people of seventy millions cannot be 
exterminated, and for the future now about to be 
decided remain valuable as a friend and dangerous 
as an enemy. We have promised of our own free 
will and of our own convictions to enter a League of 
Nations which shall correspond to the principles of 
Mr. Wilson. In this voluntary step we have much to 
give the world that could never be attained by compul-
sion. Even without arms we should not be defenseless. 91 
89vorwaerts, October 27, 1918. 
90Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement l, I, 395-396; 
Amtliche Urkunden, Document 85. 
9 lvorwaerts, October 28, 1918. 
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The Berliner Tageblatt described the note as an "acknowledg ement 
of a receipt 11 • It warned against illusions and declared: 111£ we, with -
out knowing the peace conditions, allow ourselves to become completely 
def_enseless, later on they will take from us not only Danzig but much 
more besides. 1192 The Munchener Neuste Nachrichten, rebelling at 
the idea of an armistice which would leave Germany helpless, said: 
11 The German people's government proposed an armistice on t iLe basis 
of the principles announced by Wilson for a peace of justice and recon-
ciliation; it never offered to lay down its arms. 11 9 3 The Koelnische 
Zeitung considered that the road to peace lay through the offering of 
acceptable conditions to Germany. It lamented, however, that "the 
attitude of Wilson's allies to the Fourteen Points was not clear. 11 9 4 
At the time, it seems that the consequences of Germany's 
actions in asking for an armistice were dawning on many Germans. 
They knew that their country would be defenseless as a result of the 
armistice and their only protection was a favorable application of 
Wilson's principles. The idea of a League of Nations particularly 
appealed to them·. It seemed that such a body, in which Germany 
would participate, might b e able to overcome the hates eng endered 
by war and allow to Germany her place in the sun. Meeting s were 
92Berlirer Tageblatt, October 28, 1918. 
9 3Munchener Neuste Nach rich ten, October 28, 1918. 
94Koelnische Z eituna , October 28, 1918. 
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held in Germany to support such a world organization. Two such 
meetings were held in Berlin on October 28 under the sponsorship 
of the P eople 1s Association for Freedom and Fatherland. Dr. 
Bernhard Dernberg, the ex-Colonial Minister, spoke of the history 
of the idea of a League of Nations and traced it back to Immanuel 
Kant. He said that Wilson's Fourteen Points covered the same ideas 
as did Kant's writings on the subject. However, he opposed a League 
of Nations whose only purpose was to impose peace conditions on 
Germany. The meeting ended with the passing of a resolution which 
supported a l eague which would allow Germany to develop and liv e, 
At the same time as the above mentioned meetings, the Executive 
Committee of the German Society for International Law was carrying 
on investigations and preliminary work for the creation of a league. 
To this organization belonged some of the most com.petent experts 
. t · 11 . G 95 on 1n ernahona aw 1n ermany. 
It is unfortunate that there are so few indications of how the 
man on the street felt about the peace in general and the Fourteen 
Points in particular .. Probably, at this point of the game, he wasn't 
thinking too much about Wilson's principles except as they seem ed to 
give him his best chance to get out of a bad situation. The Germans, 
in October, 1918, were exceptionally war-weary . It is reported that 
on October 5, the Prince made his speech inform ing the Germans of 
9 5naily Review, November 1918, p . 22. 
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the request for an armistice, the people on the streets of Berlin 
assumed a festive mood upon hearing the news. On October 9, Hans 
Hans sen, the Danish leader, reported the followin g : 
I went to the Reichstag at five o'clock. 
(Robert) Lansing's first reply to the note sent to 
Wilson had just arrived, and it aroused much in -
terest. It was eagerly discussed by the parties, 
which gathered in groups .... 
When I returned to the hotel, I met a business 
leader on my floor. 
"How are things going? 11 he inquired, muc h 
interested. "Peace is coming, 11 I replied. "The 
Government has decided to reply to Wilson favorably 
and to evacuate all occupied ter:z:itories, but the 
terms will be severe: Germany will lose Alsace -
Lorraine, the Polish territories, and possibly- also 
North Schleswig, and will be obliged to pay a heavy 
war indemnity. 11 
As I was about to continue, he said: 11 Many 
thanks for the good news! It is already being 
whispered that the peace will come to naught this 
time, and I was afraid of it." 
A maid was standing outside my door. 11How 
goes it? 11 she asked. 
11Peace is coming. Perhaps you can dance 
at Christinans, 11 I replied. "But it will be severe, 11 
and I repeated what I had said to the businessman. 
"Thank God! 11 she burst out. "There are so 
many who really think it is taken seriously. What 
do I care about Alsace-Lorraine and all the rest, if 
only we can have peace. But no one is going to fight 
any more, 11 she continued. 11 A major, who lives in 
372, -said to me yesterday, 'If we do not get peace now, 
under no circumstances will I go out a gain 1 • 11 Thus 
speaks a Prussian major these days to a chambermaid .. . • 9 6 
9 6Hanssen, op. cit . , p. 334. 
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This vignette, as much as the opinions of statesmen, soldiers, and 
journalists, demonstrates the true feelings of the Ger.mans. At 
that point of the game, most of them were glad to give us Alsace -
Lorraine, North Schleswig, and Polish Prussia in order to have 
peace.· 
It is not the purpose of this work to go beyond October 1918 
in investigating the German attitudes toward the Fourteen Points. 
By October, they had accomplished their purpose of bringing about 
the defeat of Germany. As a weapon they were as effective as many 
divisions. Many lives were saved because they gave the Germans 
and their allies a chance to get out of the war gracefully. As a 
c harter of a new world order, they were not as effective. But that 
is another story. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The standard interpretation of the acceptance by the 
Germans of Wilson's Fourteen Points and his subsequent clarifying 
principles in October , 1918, is that it was a death-bed repentance. 
Germany was ~ extremis and therefore clutched at Wilson I s program 
as a drowning man does at a straw. Like most such generalizations, 
this interpretation is only partly true. When the points were first 
declared, there were some sectors of German opinion which were 
ready to use them as a basis for negotiations. This group included 
the majority of the Left and a good portion of the Liberals. How-
ever, even this gr<?up, while giving consent to most of the prog ram, 
took strong exception to Points Eight and Thirteen. Under no circum-
stances would they have accepted an interpretation of these points 
which would have meant the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the alienation 
of sections of Poland inhabited mostly by Germans. 
Among the Moderates there was a rejection of the Wilsonian 
program in January , 1918. However, this hostility was actually 
directed toward the speech itself and its maker, rather than toward 
the points themselves. Again Points Eight and Thirteen were the 
stumbling blocks. No unfavorable interpretation of them was 
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acceptable to the Center Party. 
On the Right, among the militarist-annexationist groups, 
there was a direct refusal to find any virtue in the program. at the 
beginning of 1918. Wilson himself was anathema and, therefore, 
his program was unacceptable. Also, acceptance of his plan would 
have meant giving up of the imperialist aspirations of the Right. 
Three things vitiated the effect of the points in Germany 
from the very beginning. First, the Germans knew that the speech 
was a weapon of war . They knew that one of its objects was to in-
crease the political warfare within Germany and thereby to weaken 
the German war effort. They were, consequently, on guard against 
the program. 
Secondly, the Germans were aware that another objective 
of the speech was to save the Entente from the consequences of the 
Russian debacle . They knew that Wilson's words were aimed at 
placating liberal and labor criticism within the Entente caused by 
the ''secret treaties" disclosure and the Allied refusal to allow 
attendance at the Stockholm Conference. The Gern-ians also saw that 
the speech and the program were intended to hamper the peace 
negotiations at Brest. Naturally enough, there was resentment 
toward Wilson. He was a "peace and war angel" at the same time. 
The third factor which made many Germans hesitate to 
accept the Fourteen Points in January was the obvious fact that 
America's allies were not enthusiastic about them and had not expressed 
······· -~· - -------------
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their adherence to them. The statement of the Allied Supreme War 
Council of February 4 made the situation even worse. What were 
the Germ.ans to think? 
In October, the situation was different. The majority of 
the Germans accepted Wilson's program. This was not because the 
loss of German held territory was any more palatable in October 
than it had been in January, but the points offered a way out of an 
impossible situation. This was the case with Stresemann who, though 
he accepted the program, had serious doubts of Wilson's good faith 
and realized that the points could be used to cripple Germany. 
Even in the Rightist press, although they remained mostly intransi-
g ent, there were some signs of a willingness to abide by the new 
world order. 
Like so many statements of principle, there was a great 
deal of latitude in the interpretation of Wilson's program. Those 
who wished to see good for Germany in it, did so. Soon after the 
first German note, the Vorwaerts viewed the Fourteen Points as a 
guarantee of Germany's happy future among the community of nations . 
The Germania even interpreted Point Five as meaning the return of 
Germany's colonies. But by the time that Wilson's second note 
arrived, such Utopian thoughts had already been knoc k ed out of the 
heads of those who still had them. That note and the Am.erican reply 
to Austria-Hungary indicated that the Fourteen Points would be 
interpreted harshly for Germany. 
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In contrast to January, it was now the Rightist press which 
made the most penetrating analysis of the meanings of the various 
points and principles. They saw more clearly than the Liberal press 
that drastic consequences would come from acceptance. This was 
mainly because the Fourteen Points of October were in essence di£-
£erent from those of January. Wilson's interpretation of Point Ten 
xuade that clear. A peace dictated to a defeated Germany would 
:r1aturally be different from a negotiated peace. Consequently, more 
1ight was thrown on the exact meaning of the program by the annexa-
tionist press in October than by the liberal papers. 
Many Germans have claimed since the fateful days of October 
1918, that they were betrayed by Wilson's program. 11 We now know 
-that we were misled by President Wilson's Fourteen Points, held 
out to Germany for accepting the terms of this devastating truce, 11 
t'laid Adolf Hitler in 1933. 
1 
As usual with that master of the big lie, 
-there was a kernel of truth in what he said. Anyway, the Germans 
as a whole have felt that the program was never carried out in the 
spirit it should have been. They certainly were aware that there 
-would be territorial losses and high indemnities to pay. This they 
did not want, but could not avoid. They did, however, hope fervently 
-that they would be allowed to develop their national life as a full-
fledged menber of the family of nations. There was, in October and 
1Quoted from the Voelkischer Beobachter by the New York 
Herald Tribune, June 29, 1933 . 
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after, a heart-felt reliance on an espousal of the Leaoue of Nations. 
0 
The Germans hoped that they would receive understanding and for-
giveness instead of hate and vengeance. 
The saddest part of the story is that in October , 1918, the 
German Government had become democratic. Wilson's 11 consumma-
tion devotedly to b e wished for" had taken place. The tragedy is that 
subsequent events would prove that the Allies would not treat Ger -
rnan democrats any less harshly than German autocrats. 
Actually, of all the warring peoples, it was those• of the 
Central Powers who were really converted to the Fourteen Points in 
October , 1918. Certainly the Americans were not enthusiastic about 
them as they showed in November , 1918, when they in effect rejected 
them by defeating Wilson's party in the Congressional elections. 
Whatever their motives were, this fact is clear, the Germans had 
taken refuge in the Fourteen Points. The spirit of Wilson's program 
eschewed vengeance. A reading of the Entente and American press of 
the time indicates that vengeance was almost universally demanded. 
And that is what the Germans got at Versailles. How can the "guilt 
clause 11 be interpreted in any other way? 
However, de spite the miscarriage of the program, actual and 
fancied, it still lives on today. Any present day attempts to establish 
a rational world community owe their existence in part at least to the 
Fourteen Points of President Wilson. 
APPENDIX A 
THE FOURTEEN POINTS, JANUARY 8, 1918 
1 . Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there 
shall be no private international understandings of any kind but 
diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial 
waters, alike in peace and war, except as the seas may be closed in 
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of in-
ternational covenants. 
3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and 
the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the 
nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its 
mai ntenance. 
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments 
will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 
5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that 
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the 
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable 
claims of the government whose title is 1o be determined. 
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of 
all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co -
operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an 
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent 
determination of her own political development and national policy 
and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations 
under institutions of her own choosingj and, more than a welcome, 
assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. 
The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to 
come will be the acid test of their g ood will, of their comprehension 
of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their 
intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 
7 . Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and re-
stored, without . any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she 
enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act 
will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations 
in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the 
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gove rnment of their relations with one another. Without this heal-
ing act the whole structure and validity of international law is 
forever impaired. 
8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions 
restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the 
matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the 
world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace 
may once more be made secure in the interest of all. 
9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along 
clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 
10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations 
we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the 
freest of opportunity of autonomous development. 
11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied 
territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the 
sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another 
determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines 
of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the 
political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the 
several Bal kan states should be entered into. 
12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should 
b e assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which 
are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security 
of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as 
a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under inter-
national guarantees. 
13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should in-
clude the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, 
which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and 
whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity 
should be guaranteed by international covenant. 
14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific 
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political 
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 
APPENDIX B 
THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF FEBRUARY 11, 1918 
1. That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the 
essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments 
as are most lik ely to bring a peace that will be permanent. 
z. That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns 
in a ga m e, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the 
bal ance of power, but that, 
3. E ve ry territorial settlement involved in this war must be made 
in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and 
not a s a part of any mere adju stment or compromise of claims 
amongst rival states; and 
4. That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the 
u t m ost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing 
new or perpetuating old e l ements of discord and antagonism that 
w o u ld b e likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently 
of the world. 
APPENDIX C 
THE FOUR POINTS OF JULY 4, 1918 
1. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can 
separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of 
the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its 
reduction to virtual impotence. 
2. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of 
sovere i gnty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship 
upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people 
immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material in-
terest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire 
a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or 
mastery. 
3. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward 
each other by the same principles of honor and ~f respect for the 
common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens 
of all modern States in their relations with one another; to the end 
that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no 
private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought 
with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome 
foundation of a mutual respect for right. 
4. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make 
it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every 
invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more se-
cure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must 
submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot 
be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be 
sanctioned. These great objects can be put into a single sentence. 
What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the 
governed and sustained by the organized opinion of 1nankind. 
APPENDIX D 
THE FIVE PARTICULARS OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1918 
1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination 
between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do 
not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites, 
and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples 
concerned. 
2. No special or separate interest of any single nation or group of 
nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which 
is not consistent with the common interest of all. 
3. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and 
understandings within the general and common family of the League 
of Nations. 
4. And more specifically, there can be no special, selfish, economic 
combinations within the League, and no employment of any form of 
economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic 
penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested 
in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control. 
5. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be 
made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. · 
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